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ABSTRACT
This th e s is  examines the d is tin c tio n  which S t. Thomas Aquinas 
m aintains between the powers of the soul and i t s  essence, h is c r i t i c ­
ism of those who id en tify  the powers w ith the essence, and the meta­
physical b asis  fo r both h is own views and h is  c ritic ism s .
S t. Augustine, P e te r the Lombard, and e sp ec ia lly  William of 
Auvergne, a l l  hold "whole man" views which id en tify  the powers of 
the soul w ith i t s  essence. For William, the p rin c ip le  of every 
operation must be su b s ta n tia l, and the powers merely name the 
various operations of the one essence which ac ts  immediately,
Thomas d istingu ishes every c re a tu re 's  operations from i t s  
esse and consequently i t s  powers from i t s  essence. Also the id en t­
if ic a t io n  of the powers w ith the essence would mean th a t  every crea­
tu re  would always be exercising  each of i t s  operations. The powers 
of the soul are  accidents of the second species of q u a lity ; as 
acciden ts, the powers have ontological r e a l i ty .  To c a l l  the powers 
na tu ra l p ro p erties  i s  to  speak only lo g ic a lly .
Since action  i s  n a tu ra lly  p rio r  to  p o te n tia l ity , a l l  of the 
powers are named from and d istingu ished  by th e ir  operations. The 
operations are  d istinguished in  tu rn  by th e i r  ob jec ts , which th e re ­
fore u ltim ate ly  d is tin g u ish  the powers. The powers, d is t in c t  from 
the essence of the sou l, are  a lso  re a lly  d is t in c t  one from the  
o ther.
i i i
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F in a lly , the d is tin c tio n s  between operations and e sse , 
powers and essence, and esse and essence are seen to  be required 
i f  man i s  to  be d iffe re n t from God. The "whole man" view i s  seen 
to  present man as though he were God.
iv
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PREFACE
One outstanding fea tu re  of modern popular Catholicism i s  the d i­
chotomy between the soul and the body. We are constantly  enjoined from 
the p u lp it and in  re lig io u s  l i te r a tu r e  to  value only s p i r i tu a l  th ings 
and to  put aside the desires  of the body. The s p i r i t  alone i s  worth­
while : the body i s  e v il .  The two, as popularly portrayed, are two 
separate th ings which are to  be kept separate a t  a l l  co sts .
I t  hardly needs to  be said th a t th is  rad ica l dichotomy of mind and 
body is  the r e s u l t  of three cen tu ries of Cartesian th ink ing . Generally 
speaking, man fo r  Descartes i s  a machine d irec ted  by a s p i r i tu a l  soul. 
His d e fin itio n s  of thinking and extended substances estab lished  the d i­
chotomy, and h is  influence has been f e l t  ever since. The mechanical and 
s p ir i tu a l  elements are completely separate but somehow the s p ir i tu a l  
element ru le s  the body, d irec tin g  i t  to  various ac tions.
A modem reaction  to  the C artesian mind-body dichotomy i s  the 
viewpoint th a t  m aintains th a t  i t  i s  the "whole man" th a t a c ts .  Man i s  
a u n ity . I t  i s  in  h is  un ity , in  h is wholeness, th a t he performs h is  
every ac tion , whether i t  be th ink ing , or sensing, or growing, e tc . By 
the "whole man" i s  generally  meant th a t man i s  such a un ity  th a t there  
can be no d is tin c tio n  of p a rts  or powers in  him. No ac tion  i s  carried  
out by a p a rt in  him: man in  h is  e n tire ty  c a rr ie s  out each and every 
ac tion .
This notion concerning the "whole man" i s  by no means novel. An 
esp ec ia lly  outspoken upholder of th is  same notion in  mediaeval tim es i s  
the early  th ir te e n th  century theologian, William of Auvergne. W illiam 's
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extreme view concerning the sim p lic ity  of the soul precluded any d is ­
tin c tio n  of p a rts  w ith in  the sou l. There was no allowance fo r any d is­
t in c tio n  of the powers from the essence of the sou l. For William no 
m atter what ac tions man performed, he performed them in  the e n tire ty  of 
h is  essence. The whole man acted always. Since i t  i s  the whole man 
ac tin g , William maintained th a t the p rin c ip le  of each action  had to  be 
a substance. And since the whole man acting  i s  only one substance there 
can be no re a l d is tin c tio n  of the p rin c ip le s  of h is  diverse ac tions .
W illiam 's id e n tif ic a tio n  of the powers with the essence of the 
soul aroused the c r i t i c a l  i r e  of S t. Thomas Aquinas. S t. Thonas' d is ­
tingu ish ing  of the essence from esse , and h is re la tin g  of essence to  
esse as potency to  a c t ,  forced him to  d istingu ish  the powers of the 
soul from i t s  essence. He could not accept the extreme un ity  of 
W illiam 's "whole man" theory of operation. In i t s  place Thomas main­
ta ined  th a t i t  was by acciden ta l p rinc ip les or powers of the soul, 
th a t man ac ted , w ith each sp e c if ic a lly  d iffe re n t operation requ iring  
a re a lly  d is t in c t  power.
Thomas would concur th a t i t  i s  the whole man th a t a c ts , but h is 
meaning would be d iffe ren t from W illiam 's. For Thomas, man would be a 
whole composed of body and soul: the soul being the su b s tan tia l form 
of the body. Man i s  one in  the un ity  of h is  being; and he i s  one in  
the remote p rin c ip le  of h is  a c tio n s , namely, h is essence, because i t  
i s  by the essence th a t  the powers were able to  a c t .  But the powers 
are many, one fo r  each specific  ac tion  of man; and they are ordered 
one to  the o ther, because the vegetative  powers are necessary fo r  sen­
sation  to  take place, and w ithout sense knowledge, in te l le c t io n  cannot 
take place.
v i
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, I t  w ill be the concern of th is  th e s is  to  present the "whole 
man" viewpoint upheld by William of Auvergne, and then to  present the 
c ritic ism  of i t  by S t. Thomas Aquinas. S t. Thomas' own views, point 
by point in  opposition to  W illiam 's, w ill  be given, along w ith a d is ­
cussion of h is metaphysical notion of actus essendi, which i s  the 
u ltim ate basis fo r  h is  theory of the powers of the soul. VIhile none 
of the basic ideas offered here purports to  be o rig in a l, one point 
has a risen  th a t has not been explored before. This po in t i s  th a t in  
view of Thomas' theory of the powers of the soul and th e i r  d is tin c tio n  
from i t s  essence, any theory which id e n tif ie s  the powers w ith the 
essence of the soul makes man operate in  the same fashion as God. God 
alone i s  abso lu te ly  simple. In God alone i s  there no d is t in c tio n  of 
essence and esse . In God alone is  h is power the same as His opera­
tio n s . To say the same of man i s  to  make man in to  God.
In th is  th e s is , a l l  quotations are  given in  English tra n s la ­
tio n , The tra n s la tio n s  from the Latin of S t. Augustine, P e te r the 
Lanbard, William of Auvergne, and S t. Thomas Aquinas are  e ith e r  
standard, or done by the au thor. In any case, the author fu lly  
endorses them and accepts a l l  re sp o n s ib ility  fo r them. The L atin  
fo r each quotation appears in  the appropriate foo tno te . The Greek
fo r A r is to t le 's  references i s  not given. A ll quotations and re fe r ­
ences to  A ris to tle  are taken from the Oxford tra n s la tio n  of The Works 
of A r is to t le , ed ited  by W. D. Ross.
I  express my deepest appreciation  to  Dr. Joseph M. Graham, who 
d irec ted  the i n i t i a l  work of th is  th e s is , and to  Dr. John N. Deck, 
who brought i t  to  completion, and who made i t  possib le  in  the f i r s t
v i i
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place. Also I  wish to  thank Mr. Stanley B. Cunningham and Dr. Eugene 
McNamara who read the th e s is  and offered many c ritic ism s . F in a lly  I  
thank Mrs. Norah Badour who adds th is  to  the l i s t  of theses she has 
typed.
v i i i
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I  THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE POWERS OF THE SOUL TO THE ESSENCE IN SEVERAL
PRE-THCMISTIC PHILOSOPHERS
What i s  the re la tio n sh ip  ex is tin g  between the powers of the soul 
and the essence of the soul? This problem has a long h is to ry  in  media­
eval philosophy. I t  was mentioned very early  by S t. Augustine and brought 
up again around 1150 A. D. by P e ter the Lombard. Then in  the th ir te e n th  
century i t  was thoroughly discussed by a l l  the  major philosophers and 
theologians, of whcm two, William of Auvergne and S t. Thomas Aquinas give 
views which are espec ia lly  relevan t to  th is  th e s is . S t. Augustine and 
P e ter the Lombard s ta te  th a t the powers of the soul are id e n tic a l with i t s  
essence, William of Auvergne vehemently upholds th is  view and develops 
i t s  lo g ic a l conclusions. On the other hand, S t. Thomas m aintains th a t  the 
powers are acciden ts of the soul d is t in c t  from i t s  essence. Two d iffe re n t 
viewpoints then are maintained with respect to  the re la tio n sh ip  of the 
powers to  the essence of the soul. These two viewpoints, th e i r  ram ifi­
cations, and th e ir  to ta l  opposition one to  the other, are  what w ill  be 
developed in  th is  th e s is .
Thomas summarizes the positio n  of those who hold the soul to  be i t s  
powers by saying th a t "they th ink th a t the essence of the soul i s  the 
immediate p rin c ip le  of a l l  of i t s  operations;"^ meaning by th is  th a t  by 
the essence of the soul a man would understand, sense th ings, carry out 
ac tio n s , e tc . ,  and th a t th is  same essence of the soul would be ca lled
1 Quaestio Disputata De Anima, a . 12, c. (See Bibliography, Thomas 
Aquinas, S a in t, 23): Ponentes ig i tu r  quod anima s i t  suae po ten tiae , hoc 
in te l l ig u n t quod ipsa e ssen tia  animae s i t  principium immediatum omnium 
operationum animae, [H ereafter abbreviated as D. ^  AnimaTj
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
sense inasmuch as i t  was the p rin c ip le  of sensation, and would be ca lled
in te l le c t  inasmuch as i t  was the p rincip le  of in te l le c t io n , and so on
fo r a l l  the other powers. Thomas compares th is  view to  saying the heat
of f i r e  i s  i t s  liq u ify in g  power, i t s  heating power, and i t s  drying power,
2
because the same heat does a l l  three operations,
Thomas repo rts  th a t those who upheld the id e n ti ty  of the soul and 
i t s  powers were led to  th is  p o sitio n  because they considered th a t  the 
s im p lic ity  of the soul would not permit such great d iv e rs ity  as appears
3
in  the powers of the soul. They could not reconcile  the d iv e r s i t ie s  
which the powers must have to  be able to  perform so many diverse oper­
a tio n s , with the sim plic ity  which the soul has. The same simple soul 
could not have as "parts" of i t s e l f  contrary and diverse p rin c ip le s  of 
operation. Rather the whole simple soul i t s e l f  was the p rin c ip le  of 
each and every operation no m atter how many or how diverse these oper­
a tions were.
I t  i s  puzzling th a t the people who allowed no d iv e rs ity  in  the 
soul and who g rea tly  emphasized the un ity  of the soul did not see the 
problem involved in  having th a t one simple soul be the immediate p rin c i­
ple of diverse operations. I f  the soul i s  one and simple and a t  the 
same time a p rin c ip le  of operation, i t  can be the p rin c ip le  of only one 
operation. Two diverse operations would need two d iverse p rin c ip le s , 
in  no way could one and the same p rin c ip le , operating in  one and the 
same manner, perform two or more d iffe re n t kinds of operation.
To see the relevance of S t. Thomas* po rtraya l of the position
2 D. ^  Anima, a . 12, c.
3 De S p iritu a lib u s  C rea tu ris . a . 11, c. (See Bibliography, Thomas 
Aquinas, Saint 8). [H ereafter abbreviated as ^  S p ir . C reatjj
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maintaining the id e n tity  of the soul and i t s  powers, the doc trines of 
S t. Augustine, P e ter the Lanbard, and William of Auvergne w ill  be ex­
amined. These men by no means are the only upholders of th is  position  
but they are men whose thought would esp ec ia lly  have been known to  S t. 
Thomas. S t. Augustine, being one of the great L atin  doctors of the 
Church, was regarded with deep respect by C hristian  theologians and 
philosophers; and h is  works were known and thoroughly studied by a l l  
except some lik e  the L atin  A verro ists . The large number of references 
he makes to  Augustine shows Thomas' fa m ilia r ity  w ith A ugustine's views. 
The Sentences of P e ter the Lombard which had wide in fluence , were 
conmented on by a l l  men, including S t. Thomas, who were a sp irin g  to  
teach in  the u n iv e rs it ie s  of the tim e. William of Auvergne was an 
im portant, source to  S t. Thomas because of h is eminent position  as 
Bishop of P aris from 1228 to  1249. Because of the au th o rity  of h is  
position , W illiam 's views would have been w ell known to  S t. Thomas, who, 
a t  W illiam 's death, would have ju s t re a lly  begun h is  own career. How­
ever i t  should be noted th a t while S t. Thomas d ire c tly  answers many of 
the views upheld by William of Auvergne, he never a c tu a lly  names William 
as the man he i s  re fu tin g . Rather W illiam 's views are included under 
those of "sane philosophers" whom S t. Thomas happens to  be dealing  w ith 
a t  the time.
Concerning th is  problem the source in  St..A ugustine which Thomas
4
mentions most often  i s  the De T r in i ta te . Two statem ents from th is  
work of S t. Augustine are used by Thomas to  s ta te  the position  th a t  the
4 See fo r  example S t. Thomas' works: De S p ir . C reat. , a . 11, 
obj. 1 and obj. 8; D. ^  Anima, a . 13, obj. 4; Summa Theologiae I ,  
q. 77, a . 1, obj. 1 and obj. 5 (See Bibliography, Thomas Aquinas, 
S a in t, 29). [h e reafte r abbreviated as Sum. Theol/^
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powers and the essence of the soul are id e n tic a l. The f i r s t  statement 
i s  th a t mind, knowledge and love e x is t in  the soul su b s ta n tia lly , or 
e sse n tia lly :  they are not in  the soul as in  a sub ject, a s , fo r  in s t ­
ance, colour, or shape, or any other q u a lity  or quan tity  are  in  a body,^ 
Augustine explains th is  by saying th a t accidents are confined to  the 
p a rtic u la r  subject in  which they e x is t while the mind can love both 
i t s e l f  and things ex te rnal to  i t  with the same love; and i t  can also 
know th ings ex ternal to  i t s e l f .  Love and knowledge then are substan­
t i a l  ju s t  as the mind ( s icu t ipsa  mens) . And the re la tio n sh ip  ex is tin g  
among these th ree  i s  not lik e  th a t of colour in  a coloured sub ject, 
where the colour has no substance of i t s  own but e x is ts  in  the substance 
of the coloured body. Rather the re la tio n sh ip  i s  l ik e  th a t ex is tin g  
between frien d s who are a lso  men. The men are each substances in  them­
selves. They are not men re la tiv e ly , but they are frien d s re la tiv e ly .^
7
Mind, knowledge, and love are  found " a l l  in  a l l " .  Augustine explains 
th is  by saying th a t the mind i s  in  i t s e l f ,  while in  re la tio n  to  i t s  
knowledge i t  i s  said to  be both knowing and known, and in  re la tio n  to  
i t s  love i t  i s  said to  be both loving and loved. Knowledge too , while 
i t  i s  re fe rred  to  a mind th a t knows or i s  known, even in  respect to
5 Augustine, De T r in i ta te , IX, 4 , Q '.L. 42, 9 6 ^ ,  pp. 82, 84. 
(See Bibliography): Simul etiam admonemur, s i  utcumque videre possumus, 
haec in  anima e x is te ra , e t tanquam involu ta evolvi u t sen tian tu r e t  
dinumerentur su b s ta n t ia l i te r ,  v e l, u t i t a  dicam, e s s e n t ia l i te r ,  non 
tanquam in  subjecto, u t co lo r, aut fig u ra  in  corpora, aut u l la  a l ia  
q u a lité s  aut qu an tités . S t. Thomas gives th is  passage of A ugustine's 
with minor v a ria tio n s  in :  Sum. Theol. I ,  q. 77, a . 1, obj. 1 and obj.
5; De S p ir . C reat. , a . 11, obj. 1.
6 Ib id . , p. 84.
7 I ^ . ,  IX, 5, [P .L . 42, 965[, p. 88.
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i t s e l f  i s  said to  be both known and knowing. And love, though re fe rred  
to  a mind th a t  loves, i s  love in  i t s e l f  both as loving and loved. Mind, 
knowledge and love, then, e x is t ,  each in  i t s e l f ,  but s t i l l  m utually in  
each other so th a t  the mind th a t loves i s  in  the love, and love i s  in  
the knowledge of one th a t loves, and knowledge i s  in  the mind th a t knows. 
"These th ree , th ere fo re , are in  a marvelous manner inseparable from one 
another; and ye t each of them i s  a substance, and a l l  together are  one 
substance or essence, while the terms themselves express a mutual
g
re la tio n sh ip ."
The second statement of Augustine th a t Thomas uses i s  th a t  memory,
Q
understanding, and w ill ,  are  one l i f e ,  one mind, and one e sse n ce .'
Indeed Thomas' statement i s  not so emphatic or explanatory as Augustine's 
own words: "Since these th ree , the memory, the understanding, and the 
w il l ,  a re , th e re fo re , not th ree  l iv e s  but one l i f e ,  not th ree  minds but 
one mind, i t  follows th a t they are c e rta in ly  not th ree  substances, but 
one s u b s t a n c e . M e m o r y ,  understanding, and w ill  are one substance be­
cause, each of them, when considered in  i t s e l f ,  i s  l i f e ,  mind, and sub­
stance. But they are  three in  th e i r  mutual reference to  one another.
Each i s  comprehended by each one and a l l  are comprehended by each one.
8 Ib id . , p. 90: Miro itaque modo t r i a  i s t a  in sep a rab ilia  sunt a 
sem etipsis, e t tamen eorum singulum quoique substan tia  e s t ,  e t simul 
omnia una substan tia  vel e sse n tia , cum re la tiv e  d ican tu r ad invicem.
9 Augustine, De T r in i ta te , X, 11 [P .L . 42, 9 ^ ,  p. 156: Et haec 
t r i a  Qtiemoria, in te l l ig e n t ia ,  voluntas] unum, una v i ta ,  una mens, una 
e ssen tia . S t. Thomas s l i ^ t l y  m odifies th is  reading to : Memoria, in ­
te l l ig e n t ia ,  e t voluntas sunt una v i ta ,  una mens, e t  una e sse n tia .
See: Sum. Theol. I ,  q. 77, a . 1, obj. 1; and De S p ir . C reat. . a . U  
obj. 8; a lso  g . D. ^  Anima, a . 13, obj. 4«
10 Ib id . , [p .L . 42, 983}, p. 154: Haec ig i tu r  t r i a ,  memoria, in ­
te l l ig e n t ia ,  vo luntas, quoniam non sunt t r e s  v ita e , sed una v i ta ;  nec 
t r e s  mentes, sed una mens: consequenter utique nec t r e s  substan tiae  
sunt, sed una substan tia .
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That i s  to  say th a t  a man remembers th a t he has memory, understanding, 
and w ill ;  and he understands th a t he understands, w il ls ,  and remembers; 
and he w ills  th a t he w il ls ,  remembers, and understands: and he remembers 
h is  whole memory, h is  whole understanding, h is  whole w il l ;  and he under­
stands and w ills  h is  whole memory, h is  whole understanding and h is  whole 
w il l .  Each i s  a whole equal to  a l l  the o thers together as wholes.
The point which Thomas re fe rs  to  in  Augustine pervades both of 
these statem ents of A ugustine's po sitio n . Augustine i s  centering  h is  
a tte n tio n  on the human mind, searching there fo r  images of the Blessed 
T rin ity . He finds two: the image found in  the mind, knowledge, and love 
of man, and the image in  h is  memory, understanding, and w il l .  In both 
of these images i t  has been seen above how Augustine in s is te d  th a t the 
p a rts  were re la ted  as ind iv idua l substances, a l l  the while emphasizing 
th a t the re la tio n sh ip  was such as to  form only one substance. A ll of 
the p a rts  are substances in  themselves and so encompass a l l  the others 
as to  be equal to  them in  the whole, and yet inseparable from them.
The id e n tif ic a tio n  of these p a rts  or powers with the one substance of 
man i s  what S t. Thomas w ill have to  contend with.
But long before S t. Thomas was to  tack le  the question, P eter 
the Lombard puzzled over these same te x ts  of S t. Augustine. In h is  
Sentences P e ter s ta te s  th a t the  mind of man i s  a ra tio n a l s p i r i t ;  
and th a t h is  essence i s  s p ir i tu a l  and incorporeal. He goes on then 
immediately to  say th a t memory, understanding, and w il l ,  which are 
"natu ra l p roperties or powers" of the soul are  d if fe re n t from the 
soul and from each o ther: memory i s  d if fe re n t from understanding, and
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both o f th e se  d i f f e r  from w il l .^ ^  The occurence o f th e  e x p ress io n  
"natural p r o p e r tie s  or powers" should be noted here because o f  the  
development S t .  Thomas w i l l  g iv e  to  i t ,  and which w i l l  be examined 
below .
P eter the Lombard, in  l ig h t  of h is viewpoint wondered how the
th ree  powers could be considered as only one essence. He did not long
dwell on i t  though, working out an answer from A ugustine's position
th a t the powers are not in  the  soul in  the same way th a t  the accidents
of colour and shape a re . P e te r says the th ree  powers are  said to  be
one substance with the soul because they e x is t in  the soul su b s ta n tia lly
and are not able to  come and go in  the same way as accidents in  a sub- 
12je c t .  S t, Thomas came to  know the views of Peter the Lombard when 
he commented on the Sentences, From P e ter he took the term "natu ra l 
property" and gave i t  p recise  and la s tin g  meaning in  the context of 
the problem of powers and th e i r  re la tio n  to  the essence of the soul. 
A fter P e ter the Lombard's consideration of the re la tio n sh ip  
between the powers and the essence of the soul, no new developments 
took place in  reference to  the problem fo r  over a century. Odon L o ttin  
has searched in  vain the works of such men as Gandulph of Bologna,
11 P eter the Lombard, L ib ri IV Sententiarum, l ib .  I ,  d. i i i ,  
cap. 2, tom .I, p. 35j (See Bibliography, P e ter the Lombard): Mens enim, 
id  e s t  sp ir i tu s  r a t io n a l is ,  e ssen tia  e s t  s p ir i tu a l is  e t  incorpores.
I l i a  vero t r i a [memoria, in te l l ig e n t ia ,  voluntas]n a tu ra les p ro p rie ta tes  
seu v ire s  sunt ip s iu s  mentis e t  a se invicem d iffe ru n t, quia memoria 
non e s t  in te l l ig e n tia  ve l voluntas, nec in te l l ig e n t ia  voluntas sive 
amor. [ I t a l i c s  mineT[
12 Ib id . : Sed iam videndum e s t ,  quo modo haec t r i a  (memoria, 
in te l l ig e n t ia ,  voluntas] d ican tu r una substan tia ; ideo s c i l i c e t ,  quia 
in  ipsa  anima v e l mente su b s ta n tia l i te r  ex is tu n t, non s icu t acc iden tia  
in  subiecto , quae possunt adesse e t abesse.
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8Simon of Tournai, Prevostin  of Cremona, Master M artin, Stephen Langton, 
P e ter of Capua, and Godefrey of P o it ie r s , fo r  some trace  of the
problem.
In S t. Thomas' own time however the problem was being discussed 
again qu ite  avidly  and the  man who most immediately s ta ted  the pos­
i t io n  Thomas was to  oppose was William of Auvergne. The position  
which William of Auvergne upholds, id en tify in g  the soul and i t s  powers, 
a rise s  fran  h is  notion of the soul as being abso lu te ly  without com­
position . William conceives the soul as a un ity , ab so lu te ly  simple, 
and th is  sim p lic ity  precludes any p a r t i t io n  in  i t .  So strongly  does 
William uphold h is  th e s is  fo r  the sim plic ity  of the soul th a t he con­
siders as ch ild ish  and imbecile any who would say th a t the soul i s  a 
p o ten tia l or v ir tu a l  whole composed of many na tu ra l po w ers,^  S t. Thomas 
would agree w ith William th a t the sim p lic ity  of the soul precludes any 
d iv ision  of i t  in to  p a r ts . For Thomas the whole soul i s  to ta l ly  in  
each p a rt of the body, but i t  operates through the  various p a rts  of the 
body by means of the various powers.
The substance of the human soul i s  one according to  William of 
Auvergne, and the p lu ra l i ty  of powers th a t i s  a ttr ib u te d  to  i t  i s  
reduced to  the  p lu ra li ty  of operations in  which the soul cooperates.
13 Odon L o ttin , Psychologie e t  Morale dans le  Xlle e t X llle  
S iè c le s , Vol. I ,  p. 484, note 3, iSee Bibliography]?
14 William of Auvergne, De Anima, c. i i i ,  pars la ;  p. 87 of 
Supplementum; (See Bibliography, William of Auvergne): Verum quoniam 
in  hoc adhuc sum, u t removeam ab anima humana compositionem cmnem, 
faciam te  sc ire  unitatem ac sim plicitatem  ejus quae prohibet ab ea 
partem e t  partem, e t aggrediar destruere  errorem quorundam qui 
putaverunt earn ccmpositam esse ex v iribus sive p o te n tiis  su is  na tu ra l- 
ibus, p rop ter quod e t dixerunt earn, nominatione p u e r i l i t a t i s  suae
e t  im b e c i l l i ta t is ,  totum p o te n tia le , totumque v ir tu a le , e tc .
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Even though he a tt r ib u te s  understanding to  the in te l l e c t ,  and w illin g  
and desiring  to  the w ill  and to  the desidera tive  power, William s t i l l  
m aintains th a t i t  i s  the one soul i t s e l f  which understands, w il ls ,  and 
d e s ire s . Moreover the soul knows a l l  th is  in  i t s e l f  by a fee lin g  or 
in tu it io n . William says th a t the soul with absolute c e r ta in ty , con­
s ta n tly  a s se r ts  in  i t s e l f ,  concerning i t s e l f ,  th a t i t  i s  i t  i t s e l f  
th a t understands, th a t has knowledge of th ings , th a t becomes acquainted, 
th a t w il ls ,  d e s ire s , and lu s ts  a f te r  th ings, th a t inqu ires a f te r  the 
th ings desired , and when ab le , lays hold of what i s  desired . The soul 
a s se r ts  th a t i t  i s  i t  i t s e l f  th a t remains one and in d iv is ib le  through­
out a l l  these operations, w ithout which operations i t  would be im­
possible even to  d iscern  the d if fe r in g  powers which are a ttr ib u te d  to  
i t .  Whether the powers are substances o ther than the soul i t s e l f ,  or 
whether they are accidents of the soul, William says i t  i s  impossible 
to  speak of them in  any way a t  a l l  apart from th e i r  o p e r a t i o n s . H e  
in s i s t s  th a t i t  i s  proper to  speak of the powers of the soul only in
15 William of Auvergne, De Anima, c. i i i ,  pars 10a; p. 98 of the 
Supplementum; Una e s t substan tia  animae humanae, e t p lu ra l i ta s  virium 
quae ponitur e i  non ponitur n is i  secundum p lu ra lita tem  operationum 
i l l i u s  e t  cooperationum ejusdem ad i l i a s .  Et quamquam in te l l ig e re  
v i r tu t i  in te l le c tiv a e  a ttr ib u a tu r , velleque e t  desiderare v i r tu t i  
desiderativae atque v o lu n ta ti, ip sa  tamen anima una e s t  q u a e in te l l ig i t ,  
v u lt atque d es id e ra t, e t hoc cmnis anima humana s e n t it  in  semetipsa, 
cognoscit certissim e, atque t e s t i f i c a tu r ,  nec possib ile  e s t  e i u t 
m entiatur super hoc. Absque enim u lla  dubitatione constantissimeque 
a s s e r i t  apud semetipsam e t  in  seipsa: Ego sum quae in te l l ig o , quae 
scio , quae cognosce, quae volo, quae appeto, quae desidero, quae 
desideria  seu v o lita  inqu ire  e t ,  cum possib ile  e s t  e t  l i c e t ,  acquire 
v o l ita , desidera ta  e t  a p p e tita . Ego, inquam, una e t  in d iv isa  manens 
per omnia haec, a lioqu in  nec sc ire , nec in te l l ig e re ,  nec u llo  modorum 
cognoscere cujuscumque v i r tu t i s  quid e s se t, s icu t ev iden ter declaratum 
e s t t i b i  in  proxime praecedentibus. Sive enim v ir tu te s  s in t  a lia e  
substantiae quam s i t  ipsa anima humana, im possibile e s t  v e ra c ite r  de 
e is  d ic i  quamcumque ex hujusmodi operationibus, sive acciden tia  s in t  
s im il i te r .
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r e la t io n  t o ,  or comparison w ith , th e  p lu r a l i t y  or m u ltitu d e  o f the
a c ts  and o p era tion s o f th e  so u l.^ ^  How h e a r t i ly  Thomas Aquinas would
agree with William of Auvergne's l a s t  po in t, th a t the powers are
spoken of only in  re la tio n  to  th e ir  operations. But how d if fe re n tly
they w il l  use th is  po in t, how d if fe re n t w ill  be th e ir  f in a l  so lu tions
to the problem of relating the powers to the essence of the soul,
William continues on from th is  point to  s ta te  th a t the operations
of the soul cctne from the soul i t s e l f  and cannot be enumerated except
17
as being in  the soul i t s e l f .  He means th a t instead  of there  being
many d iffe re n t powers there i s  one soul exercising  many operations, and
each operation gives i t s  name to  a d if fe re n t "power". "Power in  the
human soul i s  nothing other than the soul i t s e l f  in  those th ings which
18i t  does by i t s  essence." As an example William says th a t  in  saying 
the human soul i s  able to  understand, or to  know, the verb " is  able" 
adds nothing to  the essence of the soul. In  th is  respect William 
compares the soul to  God because he says th a t n e ith e r in  the Creator 
nor in  the human soul i s  there  any power, except the essence both of 
God and of the soul, which i s  the p rinc ip le  and cause of any
16 William of Auvergne, De Anima, c. i i i ,  pars 6a; pp. 92-3 of 
the Supplementum; Ex i i s  ig i tu r  quae hie a u d iv is ti manifestum e s t quia 
m inoritas e t p lu ra l ita s  potentiarum non d ic i tu r  apud animam humanum 
n is i  re la tio n e  vel ccmparatione ad p lu ralita tem  sive multitudinem 
actuum e t operationum quae ab ipsa  anima sunt, neque a l i t e r  e s t 
p o ss ib ile  eas numerari, aut numerum in  anima humana inven ire ,
17 Ib id .
18 Ib id . ;  P o ten tia  apud animam huraanam n ih il  e s t  a liud  quam ipsa  
anima in  i i s  quae operatur per essentiam suam.
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1 9operation.
He explains th is  comparison more fu l ly  when he says th a t since i t  
i s  most true  th a t  the Creator i s  powerful, i t  i s  most proper and tru e  to  
say He has power. But th is  power i s  nothing other than Himself, and 
to  p redicate power of God adds nothing to  His essence. S im ilarly  W ill­
iam says th a t the  human sou l, or anything e lse  which e x is ts  only by i t s
20essence, has nothing added to  th a t essence by p red icating  power of i t .
19 Ib id . : Jam ig i tu r  fe c i  te  sc ire  per hoc quod po ten tia  apud 
animam humanam n ih i l  e s t a liud  quam ipsa anima in  i i s  quae operatur 
per essentiam suam. Exempli g ra t ia , cum d ic itu r ;  anima humana po test 
in te l l ig e re  v e l po test sc ire , e t ad hunc modum de a l i i s ,  dico quod hoc 
verbum po test n ih i l  add it super essentiam ip s iu s  quemadmodum d ic i tu r  de 
Creators benedicto. Causa autem in  hoc e s t ,  quoniam neque apud C reator- 
em, neque apud animam humanam e s t po ten tia , principium e t  causa hujus­
modi operation is n is i  utriusque e sse n tia , s icu t verbum i l lu d  in  hujus­
modi sermonibus praedicat potentiam ex qua sunt hujusmodi operationes, 
indub itan ter non praed icat n is i  essentiam u tr iu s lib e t  earum in  hujus­
modi operationibus. In e is  vero quae anima humana non operatur per 
essentiam suam n ih i l  prohibet p raed icari a liud  vel a l i a ,  s i  qua tamen 
hujusmodi sunt.
20 William of Auvergne, De Anima, c. i i i ,  pars. 5> p. 90 of the 
Supplementum; Dico ig i tu r  quia c rea to r s icu t verissim e potens e s t ,  sic  
verissim e ac proprie posse d ic i tu r ,  quapropter verissim a ac proprissim a 
e s t  enun tia tio  haec de eo, c rea to r p o tes t, c rea to r e s t potens. Jam 
autem declaratum e s t  in  prima parte  primi s a p ie n tia lis  ac d iv in a lis  mag- 
i s t e r i i ,  quoniam ipse non p o tes t, nec potens e s t ,
propter hoc quod po ten tia  qua po tes t v e l potens e s t ,  non e s t a liud  ab 
ipso , a liud  inquam subjecto, ve l e ssen tia , seu v e r i ta te :  quapropter cum 
d ic itu r  de eo quia po test ve l potens e s t ,  non add itu r a liq u id  per 
huiusmodi praedicationem, ve l ponitur supra ipsum. Quapropter po ten tia  
quae huiusmodi sermonibus p raed ica tu r, vel a ffirm atu r non e s t  a liud  
additum supra ipsum, vel in  ip so . Et eadem v ia  d ec la rab itu r t i b i  hoc 
de omnibus quae non possunt n is i  per semetipsas vel e ssen tia s  suas. Et 
s i  anima humana secundum hunc modum po test vel potens e s t quoties d ic­
i tu r  de ea quia po test ve l potens e s t ,  non s i t  ad d itio  supra ipsam vel 
ejus essentiam , nec p o s itio  in  ip sa , cum n ih i l  addi p o ss it s ib i  ip s i  
supra se ve l poni in  se ipso . And he adds fu r th e r ; Ib id . ,  p. 91: 
Declaratum ig i tu r  e s t  t i b i  in  huiusmodi sermonibus, albedo po test 
disgregare visum, po test calo r ca lefacere , quod hoc verbum po test n ih i l  
add it supra essentiam ejus de quo d ic i tu r ,  v e l cmnino n ih i l  ponit aut 
affirm ât de huiusmodi subjecto supra essentiam su b jec ti de quo d ic i tu r ,  
aut solum actum qui consequenter in  e is  s ig n if ic a tu r  p raed ica tu r vel 
a ffirm atu r de i l l o ;  non dico ponit in  i l l o ,  sed magis ab i l l o  e t  hic 
e s t  modus praedicandi, e t  haec in te n tio  in  omnibus verb is vere a c t iv is .
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S t. Thomas w ill  pay p a rtic u la r  a tte n tio n  to  the type of argument ju s t 
advanced by William. That William could draw so close an analogy 
between the  operations of God and the operations of man shows how 
ra d ic a lly  d iffe re n t h is  metaphysical b a sis  must be from th a t of S t. 
Thomas.
Three arguments of William of Auvergne provide support fo r  h is  
id e n tif ic a tio n  of the powers with the essence of the soul. In  the 
f i r s t ,  he s ta te s  a th e s is  which S t. Thomas w ill spend much e f fo r t  to  
explain: William denies th a t there  can be any medium between a sub­
stance and an acciden t. He says, using derisive  terminology again fo r  
emphasis, th a t  i t  i s  impossible fo r  an accident to  understand or desire  
something, or to  do anything of the so r t;  and th a t only an imbecile 
would say th a t i t  could. Only a substance, and a liv in g  substance a t  
th a t ,  can understand, and love, and get angry, e tc . A ll the powers then 
must be substances and therefo re  they must be the whole soul i t s e l f  
operating. But then William adds the curious phrase: "or p a rt of i t "  
( th a t i s ,  the sou l), which seems to  imply th a t a part of the soul 
could operate. This in te rp re ta tio n  however i s  contrary to  everything 
William holds w ith respect to  the absolute sim plic ity  and un ity  of the 
soul.^^
The second argument i s  th is  very sim p lic ity  of the sou l. With no 
p o s s ib il i ty  of there  being any p a rts  in  the soul, William says th a t i t  
i s  necessary fo r  the human soul in  i t s  t o ta l i ty  to  be every power th a t
21 William of Auvergne, De Anima, c. i i i ,  pars 6a; p. 92 of the 
Supplementum: Et quia ig i tu r  non e s t  poss ib ile  accidens a liqu id  
in te l l ig e re  v e l concupiscere, aut a liq u id  aliorum hujusmodi e ff ic e re ;  
nemo enim adhuc im b e c illita te  tan ta  d e s ip u it, u t d ice re t a liq u id  
posse in te l l ig e r e ,  v e l amare, ve l i r a s c i ,  quod quamque hujusmodi 
potentiarum seu virtutum  substantiam esse , e t propter hoc v e l ipsam 
totam animam vel partem ip s iu s . Q ta l ic s  minetj
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operates in  any way. To fu rth e r develop th is ,  William says th a t when 
a power is  considered to be a principle of operation, this does not 
p osit sane e ffe c tiv e  p rin c ip le  am the soul and predicated of i t ,  but 
ra th e r  i t  i s  sonething from the soul. The many powers are  not in  the 
soul by number and by power but ra th e r  only by re la tio n  to  and com­
parison w ith the many operations of the whole soul. The soul has i t s
22powers in  the same way th a t  i t  has i t s  essence or substance. Under­
ly ing  th is  position  of William of Auvergne i s  again an analogy between 
the soul and God. William holds th a t the many operations flow from the 
simple soul in  the same way th a t many Divine Ideas flow from God with­
out in  any way destroying His sim p lic ity .
In h is  th ird  argument in  support of the id e n tif ic a tio n  of the 
powers with the soul William introduces a principle of distinguishing 
the powers. He says th a t  the powers are not d istingu ished  according to  
th e i r  essence but according to  th e ir  o ff ice ; and by way of i l lu s t r a t io n  
compares the powers to  a man exercising various o f f ic ia l  cap ac itie s  in  
c iv i l  society . In  the same way th a t one and the same man i s  a t  the 
same time a duke, a c o u rtie r , a leader of a c ity , and sometimes a 
counselor or senator, so one and the same sou l, re ta in in g  always i t s  
unity  and in d iv is ib i l i ty ,  a t  the same time i s  i t s  power of understanding, 
i t s  power of reasoning, and i t s  power of w illin g . The powers of the
22 Ib id . : Jam autem removi t i b i  p a rtia lita tem  ab ea e t  p a r t i b i l i t -  
atem: quare necesse e s t  animam humanam esse unamquamque huiusmodi pot­
entiarum e t  virtutum  t o t a l i t e r ;  e t quemadmodum a u d iv is ti  ex sermonibus 
A r is to te l is  potentiam e t  virtutem  earn e t esse e t d ic i  non ex eo quod 
e s t ,  sed inquantum e s t  principium e t  causa cuiuscumque opera tion is.
Per huiusmodi vero sermones principium effectivum e t  causa non ponitur 
a liq u id  in  ea cum de ip sa  p raedicantur, sed potius ab ea. Est ig i tu r  
d icere multas po ten tias non quidem essen tia  ve l subjecto sive numéro e t 
v i r tu te ,  sed re la tio n e  sive respectu  v e l comparatione actuum e t operat­
ionum multarum* quapropter hoc modo d ic i tu r  habere potentiam v e l pot­
e n tia s  huiusmodi quemadmodum e t  habere essentiam v e l substantiam .
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soul are  named from the  various operations of the whole soul in  the
23same way th a t a man i s  named fo r  h is  various c iv i l  p o sitio n s .
The basic theme common to  the  te x ts  of S t. Augustine, P e te r the 
Lombard, and William of Auvergne presented above, i s  th a t the essence 
of the soul i s  the immediate p rin c ip le  of a l l  of the so u l 's  operations. 
The essence and the powers of the soul are id e n tif ie d , W illiam, how­
ever, goes on much more strongly  to  emphasize th a t the powers could 
not be accidents of the sou l; and th a t the d is tin c tio n  of the powers i s  
merely nominal, id en tify in g  the d iffe re n t operations of the one essence 
of the soul. Now unless S t. Thomas i s  to  adopt the same position  
concerning the soul and i t s  powers as ju s t  presented he w il l  have to  
introduce some ra d ic a lly  new element in to  the d iscussion . But he w ill 
not support these views: point by point he r e je c ts  them. In th e ir  place 
he su b s titu te s  h is  own ideas concerning the soul and i t s  powers, based 
on the metaphysical foundation of actus essendi. From h is devasta ting  
c ritic ism  of the id e n tif ic a tio n  of the powers w ith the soul; through 
h is  development of the powers as p roperties  and acciden ts of the soul; 
to  h is  d istingu ish ing  of the powers by th e ir  a c ts  and ob jec ts; S t.
Thomas con tinually  has in  mind h is  notion of actus essendi as the basis 
fo r  the whole development of the problem. How S t. Thonas' notion of 
actus essendi underlies h is  c ritic ism  of early  th inkers on the problem
23 Ib id . : Quod autem d iv id itu r  v e l d is tin g u itu r  in  po ten tias aut 
v ir tu te s  sive per i l l a s ,  non secundum essentiam e s t ,  v e l s i t  hoc, sed 
secunda o f f ic ia . Quemadmodum enim apud homines vivos e t idem homo, e t 
dux, e t comes e s t ,  e t marchio, e t po testas a licu ju s  c iv i t a t i s ,  e t consul 
interdum atque senator: s ic  una e t eadem anima, in  u n ita te  atque im- 
p a r t ib i l i t a te  sua p e rs is ten s ac peraanens, simul e s t  v is  in te l le c t iv e ,  
e t  v is  ra t io n a l is ,  e t  volens, quod e s t d icere v ir tu s  volendi. Eodem 
modo concup isc ib ilis  vel i r a s c ib i l i s ,  sed pro v a rie ta te  operationum quas 
e f f i c i t ,  seu p e r f ic i t ,  d iversae v ir tu te s  ac po ten tiae  nominatur, 
quemadmodum unus e t idem homo, pro v a rie ta te  dignitatum  e t  officiorum , 
a n te d ic t!s  ncminibus nominatur.
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of re la tin g  the powers to  the soul, and how S t. Thonas' notion of 
actus essendi underlies h is  own position  concerning the powers of the 
soul w il l  be the concern of th is  th e s is .
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
I I  ST. THOMS' CRITICISM CF THE PREVIOUS THINKERS
The examination of the te x ts  from S t. Augustine, P e te r the Lombard, 
and William of Auvergne in  the preceding section , bore out S t. Thomas' 
summary th a t they held the  essence of the soul to  be the  immediate 
p rinc ip le  of i t s  operation. This point i s  more basic than the 
other two which were a lso  raised  th e re , concerning the d is t in c tio n  of 
the powers and whether they were substances of acc iden ts, because these 
u ltim ate ly  depend on the f i r s t  po in t. Since the id e n tif ic a tio n  of the 
powers w ith the essence of the soul i s  the more basic  point i t  i s  im­
portant th a t i t  be examined before the other two. Therefore th i s  section  
of the th e s is  w il l  present S t. Thomas' c ritic ism  of the theory which main­
ta in s  the id e n tity  of the powers of the soul with i t s  essence. Because 
th is  i s  the f i r s t  time in  th i s  th e s is  th a t Thomas has been allowed to  
speak a t  leng th , i t  w ill  be the f i r s t  time th a t the notion of actus 
essendi w ill  make i t s  weight f e l t .  How much i t  pervades Thomas' C r i t i ­
cism of h is  predecessors w ill  be read ily  seen.
S t. Thomas does not agree th a t the essence of the soul i s  the im­
mediate p rin c ip le  of i t s  operations and goes to  some considerable e f fo r t  
with many d iffe re n t types of arguments to  show th a t i t  i s  impossible to  
uphold. The f i r s t  of these arguments th a t Thomas uses i s  based on the 
metaphysical notion which i s  basic to h is  vdiole philosophy, namely, the  
d is tin c tio n  of essence and esse .
The simple statement of the argument i s ;  when the operation i t s e l f  
of a th in g  i s  th a t same th in g 's  e sse , then i t  is  th a t the essence of the 
thing th a t operates i s  alone the immediate p rinc ip le  of operation; fo r
16
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ju s t  as power i s  r e la te d  to  i t s  op era tion  as to  i t s  a c t ,  so  i s  e ssen ce  
r e la te d  to  e s s e . Now on ly  in  God i s  H is a c t  ( in  t h i s  case  to  understand) 
th e same as His e s s e  ; and so  on ly  in  God i s  H is power ( in  t h i s  case i n t e l ­
l e c t )  the same as His e s se n c e . In  a l l  in t e l l e c t u a l  crea tu res  th en , the  
i n t e l l e c t  i s  a power and not th e e s se n c e .^  That i s ,  the power i s  d i s t in c t  
from the e s se n c e .
Here S t. Thomas has used generally  a proportion, i f  i t  may be so 
c a lled , re la tin g  power to  i t s  operation in  the same way th a t essence i s  
re la ted  to  e sse . For the essence to  be i t s  power then, in  th is  pro­
portion , esse would have to  be i t s  operations. But th is  i s  so only in  
Gicdj and therefo re  in  man and every other creature the p rincip le  of 
operation i s  i t s  power, not i t s  essence.
Thomas a lso  re l ie s  on the fa c t th a t esse and operation are the same 
only in  God fo r  another argument to  show th a t the powers cannot be id ­
e n tif ie d  with the essence of the soul. He s ta r ts  by saying th a t diverse 
ac ts  belong to  diverse things since a c ts  are proportioned to  the things 
of which they are the a c ts . And then he goes on to  se t up another pro­
portion : as ipsum esse i s  a kind of a c tu a lity  of an essence, so acting  
i s  the a c tu a li ty  of a power. In th is  respect then, essence i s  in  ac t 
w ith regard to  esse and power i s  in  ac t with regard to  ac tin g . Thomas 
concludes then th a t since in  no creature  i s  i t s  a c t iv i ty  the same as i t s
e sse , ( th is  belongs to  God a lone), the power of no creature i s  the same
2
as i t s  essence, ( th is  a lso  belongs to  God a lone).
S t. Thomas continues h is  a ttack  on a s l ig h tly  d iffe re n t line  when
1 Sum. Theol. I ,  2. 79, a . 1, c. The re la tio n sh ip  between the 
operations of a th ing  and i t s  esse i s  shown on pp. 3 (-  34-and on pp .74 - 
75" below; the re la tio n sh ip  between essence and esse on pp.7^"^^ below.
2 ^  S p ir . Great. . a . 11, c . : Primo quidem, quia im possibile e s t
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he says th a t potency and ac t divide being (ens) and every genus of be­
ing; so th a t a potency and i t s  ac t must be re fe rred  to  the same genus. 
From th is  i t  follows th a t i f  an ac t i s  not in  the genus of substance, 
then the potency re la te d  to  th a t a c t a lso  i s  not in  the genus us sub­
stance, But, Thomas, says, the operations of the soul are not in  the 
genus of substance, and hence the potencies which are the p rin c ip le s  of
these operations cannot be in  the genus of substance, th a t i s ,  they are
not the essence of the sou l. Only in  God i s  His power the  same as His
3
essence because only in  Him i s  the operation the same as His substance.
Continuing in  th is  vein of thought, Thomas says th a t since proper
and immediate e ffe c ts  are proportioned to  th e i r  causes, a l l  th ings having
th e ir  proximate p rinc ip le  of operation in  the genus of substance have
substances fo r  operations. But th is  i s  true  of God alonej and so only
He does not ac t by a mediate power d iffe re n t from His substance. For a l l
c rea tu res , operation i s  an accident and so the proximate p rinc ip le  of
4
operation a lso  must be an acciden t.
I t  should be noted th a t the l in e s  of reasoning which Thomas i s  
using to  show the powers of the soul are not i t s  essence and e sp ec ia lly  
the l a s t  two arguments which show th a t the p rinc ip les  of operation must 
be in  the same genus as th e ir  operations, are leading inexorably to  the 
conclusion th a t the powers of the soul are accidents of the soul. The next 
argument, which expands g rea tly  on the la s t  one, w il l  bring  th is  home even 
more sharply.
Thomas s ta r ts  the argument by s ta tin g  th a t whatever a c ts , a c ts  ac-
3 Sum. Theol. I ,  q. 77, a . 1, c . :  Primo, quia cum po ten tia  e t  . . . .
4 Scriptum super Libros Sententiarum M agistri P e tr i  Lombardi, l ib ,  
I ,  d. 3, q. 4 , a . 2 (See Bibliography, Thomas Aquinas, S a in t, 26); 
Respondeo dicendum quod . . . .
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
19
cording as i t  i s  in  a c t ,  fo r  example, f i r e  heats because i t  i s  a c tu a lly  
hot, not because i t  i s  a c tu a lly  b rig h t. Because of th is ,  every agent pro­
duces an e ffe c t s im ila r to  i t s e l f ,  and from th is  conformity, by examining 
an e ffe c t , the p rinc ip le  of the ag en t's  ac tio n  can be considered, "When, 
therefore  th a t which ac ts  does not p e rta in  to  the su b s ta n tia l esse of a 
th ing , i t  i s  impossible th a t  the p rinc ip le  by which i t  ac ts  be anything 
of the essence of the th in g .T h o m a s  goes on to  show how th is  i s  very- 
evident in  the case of na tu ra l agents which in  generation a c t by 
changing m atter with respect to  sane form. M atter i s  f i r s t  disposed to  
receive the form, and then does receive i t ,  according as generation i s  
the terminus of a l te ra t io n . I t  i s  necessary on the part of the agent 
th a t  th a t which immediately ac ts  be the acciden ta l form corresponding to  
the d isp o sitio n  of the m atter. This acc iden tal form acts  by the power of 
the su b s ta n tia l form, as i f  i t  were i t s  instrum ent; otherwise i t  would not 
induce a su b s ta n tia l form by i t s  ac ting . For example, a r t i f a c ts  are pro­
duced by the ac tion  of an instrum ent, which ac tion  term inates in  the form 
desired by the a r t i s t .  Any agent which d ire c tly  and immediately produces 
a substance by i t s  ac tio n , i s  ac tin g  by i t s  essence, and no ac tiv e  power 
w ill  be present other than th a t essence.
Thomas continues th is  long exposition  by saying th a t  passive powers 
ordered to  su b s ta n tia l ac ts  are in  the genus of substance, while those 
ordered to  acciden ta l a c ts  are in  the genus of accident by reduction, as 
a p rinc ip le  and not as a complete species; because every genus i s  divided 
by potency and a c t. So a p o ten tia l man ( poten tia  homo) i s  in  the genus 
of substance; and p o ten tia l white (po ten tia  album) i s  in  the genus of
5 ^.D. ^  Anima, a . 12, c . : Cum ergo id  quod a g it  non p e rtin e t ad 
esse su b stan tia le  r e i ,  im possibile e s t quod principium quo a g it  s i t  
a liq u id  de e ssen tia  r e i .
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q u a lity , "Mow" S t. Thomas says, " i t  i s  evident th a t the powers of the 
sou l, whether ac tive  or passive, are not spoken of d ire c tly  with respect
■ 6
to  som eth ing 'substan tial, but ra th e r with respect to  something acc id en ta l,"
He explains th is  fu r th e r  by using i l lu s t r a t io n s  from the powers of the
soul; the operations of understanding and sensing which are carried  out by
the powers of in te l le c t  and sense, are not the su b s tan tia l esse of the
7operator, but ra th e r  they are only i t s  acc iden ts. In the same way, to  be 
large or small i s  an acciden ta l mode of existence to  which the augmen­
ta tiv e  power i s  ordained. The generative and n u tr it iv e  powers produce and 
conserve substances, but they do th is  by changing m atter; and so, such an 
ac tion , lik e  the action  of o ther n a tu ra l agents, i s  performed by a sub­
stance through the medium of an acciden ta l p rin c ip le . So i t  i s  ev ident, 
Thomas concludes, th a t the essence of the soul i s  not the immediate
p rincip le  of i t s  operations, but th a t i t  operates through acciden ta l
8
p rin c ip le s . And so the powers of the soul are not i t s  essence.
To b r ie f ly  sum up th is  la s t  argument, note th a t Thomas s ta r ts  from 
the a sse rtio n  th a t e ffe c ts  are sim ila r to  th e ir  causes. Because of th is ,  
e ffe c ts  in  the genus of substance w ill  be produced by an e s se n tia l  p r in c i­
ple of the agent. Then he in v es tig a te s  n a tu ra l agents, ac tive  and pas­
sive powers, and the powers of the soul, showing how th e i r  various a c t­
ions are a l l  by way of some acc iden ta l p rin c ip le , from which he con­
cludes th a t the powers of th e  soul are not i t s  essence.
6 Thomas Aquinas, lo c . c i t . ; Manifestum e s t autem quod potentiae 
animae, sive s in t ac tivas sive passives, non dicuntur d ire c ts  per re s -  
pectum ad a liq u id  su b s ta n tia le , sed ad a liqu id  acc iden ta ls .
7 Ib id . ;  Et s im ilte r  esse in te llig e n s  ve l sentiens actu  non e s t  
esse su b s tan tia le , sed acc id en ta ls , ad quod ord inatur in te l le c tu s  e t 
sensus.
8 Ib id .
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Notice how also  once again the argument has led  to  the conclusion 
th a t the powers are acc iden ta l p rin c ip le s  of operation, not su b s ta n tia l.
This idea w il l  be expanded on by S t, Thomas and trea ted  a t  length below.
This argument a lso  brings to  a close the lin e  of reasoning which Thomas 
has d ire c tly  based on the proportions between power and operation and 
essence and e sse , th a t i s ,  on the d is tin c tio n  between essence and esse 
in  c rea tu res.
The f i r s t  argument which might be said to  depend only in d ire c tly  
on the d is tin c tio n  of essence and esse in  c rea tu res, i s  an argument which 
S t, Thomas builds on the nature or essence of the soul. I t  should be 
noted th a t although Thomas t r e a ts  the essence of the soul as an a c t here, 
ju s t  how and why th is  i s  so w ill  not be shown u n ti l  the next section  follow­
ing , which w ill  t r e a t  of the  essence of the soul. In  considering the soul 
Thomas says th a t i t  i s  impossible fo r  the essence of the soul to  be i t s  
powers because the essence of the  soul i s  an a c t .  So i f  the essence of the 
soul were a lso  the immediate p rin c ip le  of operation, then whatever has a
soul would always be a c tu a lly  exercising  the operations of l i f e ,  in  the same
9
way th a t whatever has a soul i s  always a c tu a lly  a liv e . S t. Thomas means 
here th a t a substance, the essence of whose soul was a lso  the immediate 
p rinc ip le  of i t s  operations would always be making use of a l l  of i t s  powers, 
fo r  example, a man would always be understanding, would always be seeing, 
would always be fee lin g , would always be moving h is limbs, e tc . ,  ju s t  as the 
substance i s  always a liv e  when the soul i s  p resen t. S t. Thomas continues by 
saying th a t the soul i s  an u ltim ate terminus of generation; i t  i s  not an ac t 
ordained to  some fu r th e r  second a c t ,  in  so f a r  as i t  i s  a form. I t s  p o te n ti­
a l i ty  to  another ac t then belongs to  i t s  power not to  i t s  essence as form.
9 Sum. Theol. I ,  q. 77, a . 1, c . j  Secundo hoc etiam im possibile . . . .
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I t s  p o te n tia l i ty  to  another ac t then belongs to  i t s  power not to  i t s  
essence as form. As sub ject of i t s  power, then, the soul i s  said to  be 
f i r s t  a c t ,  ordained to  second ac t,^^  Now nothing having a soul i s  ob­
served always a c tu a lly  to  exercise  a l l  the operations of l i f e ,  and so 
Thomas gives A r is to tle ’s d e fin itio n  of the soul: "The a c t o f a body 
having l i f e  p o te n tia lly , which p o te n tia l i ty  however does not exclude 
the soul."^^ And so Thomas concludes th a t  the essence of the soul i s  
no t i t s  power because nothing can be in  potency according to  an a c t ,  
in so fa r as i t  i s  an a c t ,
Moving on to  another tjqje o f argument, which Thomas says i s  especi­
a l ly  applicable to  the sou l, as against a l l  c reatu res in  genera l, he says 
th a t  there  are many powers on account o f the d iv e rs ity  o f ac ts  and obj­
e c ts :  these a c ts  and objects d iv e rs ify  the powers which are re la te d  to  
them because a potency is  named only in  re la tio n  to  i t s  a c t,^ ^  These 
many actions o f man, some of which are active  and some of which are pas­
s iv e , d i f f e r  g en erica lly  and must be a ttr ib u te d  to  d if fe re n t  p rin c ip le s , 
not to  ju s t  one immediate p r in c ip le . But the essence of the soul i s  one 
p rin c ip le  only. The essence then cannot be the immediate p rin c ip le  of 
a l l  the diverse actions of the sou l, but ra th e r the soul must have many 
d if fe re n t powers corresponding to  a l l  i t s  d if fe re n t ac tio n s , because a
15
power i s  re la ted  rec ip ro ca lly  to ,  and i s  named from, i t s  a c t .
10 See: A ris to tle , De Anima, I I ,  1 , (412 a27)» (See B ibliography),
11 Sum. Theol. I ,  q. 77» a .  1, o .s Actus corporis po ten tia  vitom 
hab en tis , quae taraen po ten tia  non a b i ic i t  animam. See a lso : A ris to tle , 
Do Anima. I I ,  1, (412 a25) ,
12 De S p ir . G rea t., a .  11, c . :  Primo quidem quia e ssen tia  . . . .
15 D. de Anima, a . 12, 0 . :  Deinde hoc apparat ex ipsa  d iv e r s i t -
a te  . . . .  For the re la tio n  o f a power to  i t s  a c t see the section  on the 
d is tin c tio n  of the powers, pp. 6O-66  o f th is  th e s is .
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Thomas fu r th e r  explains why i t  i s  impossible fo r  the essence, since 
i t  i s  only one p rin c ip le , to  be the p rincip le  of many diverse and even 
opposite ac tions; he says " i t  i s  impossible th a t one and the same th ing  
in  one and the same respect could n a tu ra lly  be the p rin c ip le  of many and 
diverse ac tio n s , much le ss  opposite o n e s ." ^  Rather one p rin c ip le  could 
be the p rin c ip le  of only one ac tio n . Thomas' meaning becomes more c lear 
in  the l ig h t  of A r is to t le 's  d iscussion  on self-m overs.  ^ A ris to tle  says 
here th a t "the same th ing  in  respect of the same th ing  a t the same time" 
could not move i t s e l f  as a whole. Otherwise the same th ing  could be both 
hot and not hot and the same time; or the same person could be teaching 
and being taught the same th ing  a t  the same tim e; or could be re s to rin g  
to  and being resto red  to  the same h ea lth . What A ris to tle  and Thomas are 
both ge tting  a t  i s  th a t one p rincip le  cannot be the p rincip le  of many 
operations. Many p rin c ip le s  are needed; one fo r  each sp e c if ic a lly  d if f e r ­
ent operation. This argument convincingly corroborates the c ritic ism  
16
leveled above a t the th inkers who saw no con trad iction  in  having the 
essence of the soul be the single p rinc ip le  of the many diverse operations 
of which man i s  capable,
Thomas derives another argument from the diverse sub jects of the 
powers of man. Sane of the powers are subjected in  ce rta in  p a rts  of the 
body, fo r  in stance , the se n sitiv e  and n u tr it iv e  p a rts . Other powers are 
not a c ts  of the body a t  a l l  but e x is t in  the soul alone, fo r  in stance , 
the in te l le c t  and t te  w il l .  This double subject fo r the powers would be
14 Quaestiones Q uodlibetales, X, q. 3, a . 1 (See Bibliography, 
Thomas Aquinas, S a in t, 25); Im possibile e s t  u t idem secundum idem s i t  
n a tu ra li te r  principium plurium e t  diversorum numéro, immo quasi oppos- 
itorum . [H ereafter abbreviated as Quodl^
15 A r is to tle , Physica, V III, 5, (257 a33-bl3), (See bibliography).
16 See p. 2  •
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impossible i f  the powers and the essence of the soul were the same,
because one and the same th in g  could not be the act of a body and yet
17something separate a t  the  same time and in  the same respec t.
Continuing, S t. Thomas uses the order of the powers and th e ir
re la tio n  to  one another to  show th a t essence and power are d if fe re n t.
One power can move another in to  operation, fo r example, the in te l le c t
moves the w il l .  But A ris to tle  has shown th a t the same th ing  cannot
18move i t s e l f  in  the same respect; and so i f  the powers of the soul were 
i t s  essence, one power could not move another. But since they do move
19one another the powers must be d iffe re n t from the essence of the soul.
In  the f in a l  consideration of th is  problem S t. Thomas gives a 
view which admits of a sense in  which the soul i s  said to  be i t s  own 
powers. Thcmas i s  not r e a l ly  hedging here, but he i s  leaning over back­
wards not to  impugn the words and au tho rity  of S t. Augustine who says
20th a t memory, understanding and w ill are one l i f e ,  one mind, one essence. 
Thomas re la te s  the argument of "some" philosophers who say th a t the 
above statement of S t. A ugustine's i s  true  in  the same sense th a t the 
p o ten tia l whole i s  predicated of i t s  p a r ts ;  the p o te n tia l whole being
17 De S p ir . G reat. . a . 11, c . : Secundo idem apparet ex poten- 
tio rum .. .
18 A r is to tle , Physica. V III, 5, (257 a 33- b l3 ).
19 De S p ir . G reat. . a . 11, c . î  T ertio  apparet idem ex o rd in e ... 
No attem pt w il l  be made in  th is  th e s is  to  develop Thomas' doctrine 
concerning the order and re la tio n  of the powers. For th is  doctrine  
see: Summa Theologiae I ,  q. 77, aa. 4 ;7 .
20 Augustine, De T r in i ta te . X, 11, Q’.L. 42, 9 ^  , p. 156.
See note S  > above.
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21midway between the un iversal whole and an in te g ra l whole. The 
un iversal whole i s  present to  each of i t s  parts  in  i t s  whole essence 
and power in  the way th a t animal i s  predicated both of man and of 
horse. The un iversal whole i s  properly predicated of each of i t s  p a rts . 
What i s  meant here (keeping the same example) i s  th a t animal considered 
as a un iversal whole i s  in  both man and horse e s se n tia lly . Both man and 
horse contain w ith in  themselves the essence of an im ality  to  i t s  utmost. 
And each and every other man and horse and other animal contains w ithin  
i t s e l f  the essence of anim ality . The essence i s  in  each animal and 
each animal has the fu lln ess  of the essence.
On the other hand, the in te g ra l whole i s  not present in  each 
p a rt , e ith e r  according to  i t s  whole essence or i t s  whole power, and 
so i t  cannot be predicated of each of i t s  p a rts . What i s  meant by an 
in te g ra l whole i s  something th a t i s  a composition of p a r ts . For ex­
ample, a house i s  an in te g ra l whole composed of a l l  of i t s  p a rts , th a t 
i s ,  i t  consists  of a foundation, w alls , a roof, windows, doors, plumbing, 
e tc . The in te g ra l whole cannot be predicated of i t s  p a rts  because th is  
would be to  say, fo r example, th a t a house i s  i t s  foundation, or a 
house i s  i t s  doors, and so on, which i s  obviously fa ls e . Thomas does 
say though th a t in  an improper way of speaking the in te g ra l whole can 
be predicated of a l l  of i t s  p a rts  when they are taken c o lle c tiv e ly .
For example, the w alls , the roof, foundation, e tc . ,  a l l  taken together 
do co n stitu te  a house.
The p o ten tia l whole i s  a medium between the f i r s t  two; i t  i s  in  
each p a rt according to  i t s  whole essence but not according to  i t s  whole
21 Sum. Theol. I ,  q. 77, a . 1, ad 1; see a lso ; De S p ir . G reat. . 
a . 11, ad 2 .
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power. I t  can be predicated of each part but not so properly as i s  
the un iversa l whole. To explain the p o te n tia l  whole by an example, the 
soul i s  in  each part of the body in  i t s  essence because as a substant­
i a l  foim i t  i s  the form of the whole body and each p a rt of i t .  How­
ever, the soul i s  not in  each part according to  i t s  whole power.
Rather i t  i s  only in  any one p a rt of the body with respect to  the power 
th a t i s  exercised through th a t p a rt. For example, the power of sigh t 
i s  in  the eye, i t  i s  not in  the mouth. I t  i s  in  the sense of potent­
i a l  whole, according to  S t. Thomas, th a t S t. Augustine says memory,
22understanding, and w ill  are the one essence of the soul.
To draw an analogy between the three powers Augustine gives and 
the example ju s t  given above, the essence of the soul fo r  Augustine 
would be the whole body informed by the su b s tan tia l form, and each of 
the th ree  powers would be p a rts  of the body by which the soul exercises 
i t s  ind iv idual powers. In th e  same way th a t the whole soul i s  in  each 
part of the pa rt by being the su b s ta n tia l form of the body, so the 
essence of the soul fo r  S t. Augustine would be in  each of the memory, 
understanding, and w ill  in  i t s  t o ta l i ty .  Hence i t  would be tru e  to  say 
th a t the memory, understanding, and w ill  are  the one essence of the
1 23soul.
The powers are d is t in c t  from the essence of the soul. No other 
conclusion i s  possible following S t. Thcmas' thorough, varied , and 
devasta ting  c ritic ism  of h is  predecessors. He showed from h is arguments
22 Sum. Theol. I ,  q. 77, a . 1, ad 1; see a lso ; De S p ir . G reat. , 
a . 11, ad 2 .
23 S t. Thomas' argument to  prove th a t the soul i s  to ta l ly  in  
each p a rt of the body i s  analogous, to  th is  l a s t  problem and would be 
p ro fita b ly  read. See below pp.^^-.^^of th is  th e s is .
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based on h is notion of actus essendi th a t only in  God could the 
essence be the immediate p rinc ip le  of operations. How noteworthy and 
rad ic a l a d ifference fron the analogy which William of Auvergne drew, 
making the operations of the human soul sim ilar to  God's operations. 
Thcmas' d is tin c tio n  of the powers of the soul frcm i t s  essence led  to  
the conclusion th a t the powers of the soul are acciden ts and not sub­
stances in  themselves. Ju s t what kind of accidents they are  remains to  
be seen. The position  of Thomas' predecessors and e sp ec ia lly  of 
William of Auvergne th a t only substances can ac t cannot survive the 
c ritic ism  based on Thomas' notion of actus essendi. Thomas a lso  showed 
here th a t one p rin c ip le  can give r is e  to  only one operation and th a t 
therefo re  to  perform many operations the soul n ecessa rily  has to  have 
many powers.
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. I l l  THE SOUL AS FORM AND ACT OF THE BODY
The problem with which th is  th e s is  i s  concerned, one view of 
which Thomas has already presented and c r i t ic iz e d , i s  the re la tio n ­
ship of the powers to  the  essence of the soul. In  the l a s t  section 
Thomas used an argument frcm the essence of the soul as a c t ,  to  show 
th a t the essence could not be id e n tif ie d  with i t s  powers. The general 
concern of th is  th e s is  w ith the soul, the already presented d is tin c tio n  
based on the essence of the sou l, the e s tab lish in g  of the powers as 
accidents of the soul, a l l  point out the necessity  of understanding 
exactly  what Thcmas means by the soul: what he means by c a llin g  the 
soul the f i r s t  p rin c ip le  of l i f e ,  by c a llin g  the soul the ac t of the 
body, by saying the soul can be the su b s ta n tia l form of the body. To 
find  some of Thomas' meanings and th e ir  ram ifications i s  the purpose of 
th is  next section .
S t. Thomas c a l ls  things a liv e  when they exh ib it the ex te rnal
appearance of seIf-movement. However the name i s  not meant to  s ign ify
self-movement p rec ise ly  but ra th e r i t  i s  meant to  sign ify  the  substance
which has self-movement n a tu ra lly , or which can move i t s e l f  in  any way
whatsoever to  some operation .^  "For such a na ture , to  liv e  i s  the same
2as the esse of the th in g ."  L ife s ig n if ie s  a b s tra c tly  th is  fa c t of
1 Sum Theol. I ,  q. 18, a . 2, c . : Nam v itae  nomen sumitur ex quo- 
dam ex te riu s  apparenti c irca  ran quod e s t  movers seipsam; non tamen 
e s t  impositum hoc nomen ad hoc significandum, sed ad significandum 
substantiam cui convenit secundum suam naturam movers seipsam, vel 
agere se quocumque modo ad operationem.
2 Ib id . ; Vivere n ih i l  a liud  e s t  quam esse in  t a l i  na tu ra .
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l iv in g  in  the same way th a t running s ig n if ie s  a b s tra c tly  to  run.
Living (vivum) i s  a su b s tan tia l predicate  of a th ing  then, and not an 
acciden tal one, even though i t  i s  sometimes improperly used to  sig ­
n ify  the operations of sensing or understanding.
S t. Thcmas says th a t the soul i s  defined as the  f i r s t  p rin c ip le  
of l i f e  in  those th ings of th is  world which l iv e ,  and th a t l i f e  i s  shown
3
p rin c ip a lly  by the two a c t iv i t ie s  of knowledge and movement. Thcmas 
cautions th a t every p rincip le  of v i t a l  action  i s  not a soul because 
then, fo r  example, the  eye which i s  a p rinc ip le  of v ision  would be a 
soul. Rather i t  i s  the f i r s t  p rinc ip le  of l i f e  th a t i s  called  the soul. 
Nor could a body as body be a p rinc ip le  of l i f e  or a l iv in g  th ing , 
because then every body would be a p rin c ip le  of l i f e  or a l iv in g  th ing , 
which i s  m anifestly  not tru e . I t  belongs to  a c e rta in  body to  be a 
p rinc ip le  of l i f e  or to  be l iv in g  through th a t which i s  such a body 
( per hoc quod e s t  ta le  corpus) . VRiat i s  a c tu a lly  such though has th is  
from another p rin c ip le  which i s  called  i t s  a c t. The soul then which 
i s  the f i r s t  p rinc ip le  of l i f e  i s  not a body but i t  i s  the ac t of a 
body.
A ris to tle  defined the soul, according to  Thomas, both in  view of 
i t s  essence and i t s  sub jec t.^  With respect to  defin ing the essence of 
the soul Thomas says th a t A ris to tle  f i r s t  placed substance among the 
ten  ca tego ries , and then divided i t  in to  m atter, form and the compound
3 Sum. Theol. I ,  q. 75, a . 1, c .j  . . .  quod anima d ic i tu r  esse 
primura principium v ita e  in  h is quae apud nos v iv u n t.. . .  V ita autem 
maxime m anifesta tur dup lic i opere, s c i l ic e t  cogn ition is e t  motus.
4 In A r is to te l is  Librum De Anima Comme n ta r iurn, I I ,  le c t io  I ,  n. 
214. (See Bibliography, Thomas Aquinas, S a in t, 17). [H ereafter 
abbreviated as ^  De Anim ^
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of these two, and th a t th ird ly  he distinguished two senses of the 
word act: one corresponding to hab itual knowledge and the other to 
ac tu a lly  th inking. With respect to  the subject endowed w ith a soul 
Thomas says th a t A ris to tle  d istinguished  between corporeal and incor­
poreal substances, and then divided corporeal substances in to  n a tu ra l 
and a rtific ia l bodies, and then finally distinguished between living  
and non-liv ing  n a tu ra l bodies.
Living bodies then are substances compounded of m atter and form. 
However, to  say l iv in g  body i s  to  imply two th ings: the body i t s e l f  and 
th a t by which i t  i s  a liv e ; and so, th a t which i s  re fe rred  to  as body, 
cannot i t s e l f  be the p rin c ip le  of l i f e ,  or soul, of the composite. 
Hence, Thomas says th a t A ris to tle  understood the soul to  be th a t by 
which a l iv in g  th ing  i s  a liv e , e x is tin g  in  a sub ject. The subject or 
the m atter i s  the body th a t receives l i f e .  " . . .  the sou] i s  a sub­
stance in  the manner of a form th a t determines or charac te rizes a 
p a rtic u la r  so rt of body, th a t i s ,  a physical body p o te n tia lly  a liv e .
The m atter of a liv in g  body i s  re la te d  to  the  l i f e  of th a t body as 
potency i s  to  a c t .  "The soul i s  p rec ise ly  the a c tu a l i ty  whereby the 
body has l i f e ." ^  Thomas emphasizes th a t A ris to tle  means the soul i s  
the su b s ta n tia l and not the acc iden ta l form of the body, and th a t the 
compound of soul and body must not be looked upon as though the body 
had i t s  own form making i t  a body, to  which a soul i s  superadded, 
making i t  a liv in g  body; but ra th e r th a t the body gets both i t s  being
5 In De Anima. I I ,  le c t io  I ,  n. 221: . . .  quod anima s i t  su b s tan tia , 
s icu t forma vel species t a l i s  co rporis, s c i l ic e t  corporis physici 
habentis in  potentiam vitam,
6 Ib id . . n. 2 2 2 : . . .e t  hoc e s t anima, ac tus, secundum quern corpus 
v iv i t .
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and i t s  l i f e  from the soul.
To see the re la tio n sh ip  between soul as form and soul as ac t 
the nature of form as ac t should be b r ie f ly  considered. A form through 
i t s e l f  makes a th ing  to  be ac tu a lly  because a form i s  i t s e l f  e s se n tia lly
7
an a c t. The un ity  of any th ing  composed of m atter and form then i s  
by v ir tu e  of the form i t s e l f ,  because i t  i s  the nature of a form to  be 
united to  m atter as i t s  a c t .  Hence everything i s  what i t  i s  by i t s  
form; and fo r  anything to  be p erfec t and good i t  must have a form,
g
together w ith a l l  th a t precedes and follow s upon th a t form. A form 
presupposes a c e r ta in  determ ination of i t s  p rin c ip le s  whether these 
be m ateria l or e f f ic ie n t  and the foim i t s e l f  i s  s ig n ified  by the species 
because everything i s  placed in  i t s  species by i t s  form. And upon a 
form follows an in c lin a tio n  to  the end, or to  an ac tio n , or something 
of the so r t;  fo r  everything, in  so fa r  as i t  i s  in  a c t ,  a c ts  and tends
towards th a t which b e f i ts  i t  according to  i t s  form.
There are two e ffe c ts  of form. The f i r s t  e ffe c t i s  esse because
everything has esse by means of i t s  form; and the second e ffe c t i s
9
operation, because every agent a c ts  by means of i t s  form. Thomas ex­
p lains th e  a c t of a form fu r th e r  when he says th a t by i t s  " f i r s t  act"  
a form informs m atter to  make any th ing  be what i t  i s ,  fo r  example, 
i t  i s  the ac t of the form of the body, th a t i s ,  the soul, to  make the
7 Sum. Theol. I ,  2. 76, a . 7, c. ; Forma autem per seipsam f a c i t
rem esse in  ac tu , cum per essentiam suam s i t  actus.
8 Ib id . .  q. 5, a . $, c . î  cum autem unumquodque s i t  id quod e s t ,
per suam formam; forma autem praesupponit quaedam, e t quaedam ad ipsam
ex n ecess ita te  consequuntur; ad hoc quod a liqu id  s i t  perfectum e t  bonum 
necesse e s t quod formam habeat, e t ea quae consequuntur ad ipsam.
9 Ib id . . q . 42, a . 1, ad 1: Primus autem e ffec tu s  formae e s t 
esse nam omnis res  habet esse secundum suam formam. Secundus autem 
e ffec tu s  e s t  opera tic  nam cmne agens a g it  per suam formam.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
32
body a liv in g  th ing . This f i r s t  act i s  not a ttr ib u te d  to  the suppos- 
itum, but so le ly  to  th e  form. The "second act" of a form i s  some 
operation, fo r  example to  heat, and th is  second ac t i s  a ttr ib u te d  to  
the suppositum.^^ To a ttr ib u te  second ac t to  the suppositum means 
simply th a t i t  i s  a thing th a t  a c ts , a composite of m atter and form, 
and not ju s t a form alone.
Thomas uses the d is tin c tio n ; f i r s t  a c t  i s  form and second ac t i s  
operation. He says however th a t the  o rig in a l meaning of ac t was oper­
a tio n , and th a t only secondly did i t  cone to  denote the form in so fa r
11as the form i s  the  p rincip le  and end of operation.
Thomas finds the basis fo r  the d is tin c tio n  of f i r s t  act and 
second act in  A r is to t le 's  De A n i m a . ^2 -phere, A ris to tle  gives two senses 
of the word a c tu a lity . The f i r s t  sense corresponds to  the possession 
of knowledge; and the second to  the ac tual exercise of knowledge. 
A ris to tle  says the  soul i s  a c tu a li ty  in  the f i r s t  sense, th a t i s ,  of 
knowledge as possessed, because both sleeping and waking presuppose the 
existence of the soul. Waking corresponds to  actual knowing while 
sleeping corresponds to  knowledge possessed but not employed. And in  
any ind iv idual A ris to tle  says th a t knowledge comes before i t s  employ­
ment or exercise .
Taking up th is  l a s t  statem ent, Thomas says th a t  every substance
10 De V e r ita te . q. 27, a . 3, ad 25. (See Bibliography, Thomas 
Aquinas, S a in t, 14). [H ereafter abbreviated De V eri-^
11 ^  P o ten tia  Dei, q. 1, a . 1, c . (See Bibliography, Thcmas 
Aquinas, Saint 6 ), [H ereafter abbreviated De VotTJ
12 See: Sum. Theol. I - I I ,  q. 3, a . 2, c.
13 A ris to tle , De Anima. I I ,  1 (412 a23- a27).
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e x is ts  fo r the sake of i t s  o p e ra t io n s ,w h ic h  operations are the 
ultim ate perfection  of a t h i n g . " T h e  a c tiv ity  of anything i s  i t s  
end, in  a sense, i t  i s  what i s  best in  i t ." ^ ^  Thomas explains th is  
when he says th a t the le s s  perfect e x is ts  fo r  the sake of the more per­
fe c t and hence ju s t as m atter i s  fo r the sake of fo m , so form which i s
f i r s t  a c t e x is ts  fo r the sake of operation which i s  second a c t .  There-
17fore operation i s  the end of the c rea tu re . "Second ac t i s  more per­
fe c t than f i r s t  act in  the same way th a t ac tu a l consideration  of know-
18ledge i s  more perfec t than hab itual knowledge."
The d is tin c tio n  of f i r s t  ac t and second ac t led to  A r is to t le 's  
d e fin itio n  of the soul as "the f i r s t  grade of a c tu a lity  of a n a tu ra l 
body having l i f e  p o te n tia lly  in  i t . " ^ ^  The importance of th is  d e f in i­
tio n  can be seen from Thomas' d is tin c tio n  of f i r s t  and second ac t w ith 
reference to  the two e ffe c ts  of form. As f i r s t  a c t of the body, the 
soul, i s  the form of the body. I t  i s  the very source of the esse of the 
body, and i t  makes the body to  be what i t  i s .  The soul as the f i r s t
14 Summa Contra G entiles I ,  c. 45. (See Bibliography, Thomas 
Aquinas, S a in t, 27): Omnis substan tia  e s t  propter suam operationem. 
[H ereafter abbreviated as Cont. GentTj
15 Cont. Gent. I l l ,  c. 113; Operatio enim e s t  ultim a p e rfec tio
r e i .
16 De V e rit. . q. 19, a . 1 , c . ; Operatio enim c u iu s lib e t r e i  e s t  
quasi f in is  e iu s , cum s i t  optimum in  ip sa ,
17 Sum. Theol. I ,  q. 105, a . 5, c . : Semper enim imperfectum.
18 Cont. Gent. I ,  c. 45: Actus secundus e s t p e rfe c tio r  quam 
actus primus; s icu t considerable quam sc ie n tia .
19 A ris to tle , De Anima. I I ,  1, (412 a 27).
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act of the body, as the source of esse fo r  the body, gives meaning 
to  S t. Thomas' expression: "To l iv e  i s  the e sse  of the liv in g  th ing .
The soul as the source of esse fo r  the body underlies a l l  of the  body's 
ac tions . A th ing  cannot perform i t s  actions unless i t  f i r s t  e x is ts ;  
and so the f i r s t  a c t of the body e x is ts  fo r  i t s  second a c ts . The 
operations of a th ing  always follow  on i t s  e sse .
Thomas c a l ls  a tten tio n  to  the expression in  A r is to t le 's  d e f in i-
21tio n  of the soul; "having l i f e  p o ten tia lly  in  i t . "  He says th a t a 
body ac tu a lly  a liv e  would be a l iv in g  compound and adds th a t no compound 
as such can en te r in to  the d e fin itio n  of a form. Thomas a lso  comments 
on A r is to t le 's  ad d itio n a l remark th a t the p o te n tia l i ty  of the  body did 
not exclude the soul frcm the body. Thomas says th is  means th a t the 
soul i t s e l f  i s  included in  the th ing  of which the soul i s  ca lled  the 
a c t. By way of i l lu s t r a t io n  Thomas says th a t heat i s  the ac t of what 
i s  hot, and l ig h t  i s  the ac t of what i s  lu c id . This does not mean th a t 
the hot body i s  hot in  separation from the heat but th a t i t  i s  hot 
through the heat, and th a t what i s  luc id  i s  lucid  through l ig h t ,  not 
in  separation frcm i t .  In l ik e  fashion the soul i s  said  to  be the ac t 
of a body p o te n tia lly  a liv e  because i t  i s  by the soul th a t the body i s  
a body, and i s  organic, and has l i f e  p o te n tia lly . The soul, which i s  
f i r s t  a c t , when i t  i s  said to  be in  p o te n tia l i ty , i s  in  p o te n tia l ity  
to  second ac t which i s  operation. That i s  to  say th a t  the body complete 
with i t s  soul is  p o te n tia lly  animate in  the sense th a t while i t  possesses 
i t s  f i r s t  a c t i t  does not n ecessa rily  have to  be ac tin g  in  some fashion, 
th a t i s ,  i t  does not have to  ac tu a lly  possess i t s  second a c t .  Such a
20 Cont. Gent. I I ,  c. 57: Vivere enim e s t esse viventibus.
21 ^  De Anima. I I ,  le c t io  1, n. 222.
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p o te n tia l ity  to  operate in  no way removes the soul from the body. The 
soul i t s e l f  however i s  a potency only in so fa r as i t  receives esse from
God.22
The subject of the  soul i s  an organic body. An organic body, 
Thomas explains, i s  any body which fa s  the various organs which a l iv ­
ing body needs as a consequence of the v i ta l  a c t iv i t ie s  of the soul;
and the human soul e sp ec ia lly  gives r is e  to  many d iffe re n t a c t iv i t ie s
23th a t need a wide a rray  of organs for th e ir  execution.
Thomas re la te s  th a t A ris to tle  demonstrates th a t the soul i s  sub­
s ta n tia l ly  united  to  the body, as form to  m atter; and th a t th is  demon­
s tra tio n  followed frcm h is consideration of the vegeta tive , se n s itiv e , 
motive, and in te l le c tiv e  operations of the soul. The demonstration • 
follows th is  l in e :  th a t by which a th ing  i s  f i r s t  able to  operate i s  
the fom  of the th in g  th a t i s  operating. For example, the ac t of know­
ing in  a man proceeds e ith e r  from knowledge i t s e l f  or from the soul.
But since i t  could proceed from the soul only in  so f a r  as the soul 
ac tu a lly  possessed knowledge, man must know f i r s t  by knowledge i t s e l f ,  
which then i s  a fom  of the sou l. Or again, a man becomes healthy 
e ith e r  w ith respect to  health  i t s e l f ,  or w ith respect to  the body or 
some part of i t .  But since i t  i s  by health  i t s e l f  th a t  the body i s  
healthy , health  i s  a fom  of the body.
A r is to tle , according to  S t. Thcmas, applied the same reasoning 
to  the operations of the soul. I t  i s  by the soul th a t man l iv e s  because
22 Sum. Theol. I ,  q. 76, a . 4, ad 1. For a more d e ta iled  d is ­
cussion of the  potency of in te l le c tu a l  substances see pp. 0 7 - ^ below.
23 In De Anima. I I ,  le c t io  1, n. 230.
24 De U nitate I n te l le c tu s . p. 209, column b. (See Bibliography, 
Thomas Aquinas, S a in t, 12): Hoc ergo habito  quod anima d e tem in a tu r . . .
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the soul i s  vegetative; i t  i s  by the soul th a t man senses because the 
soul i s  se n s itiv e ; i t  i s  by the soul th a t man moves because the soul 
i s  capable of motion; i t  i s  by the soul th a t  man knows because the soul 
i s  in te l le c t iv e .  From t h i s  Thomas says th a t  i t  i s  evident th a t the soul 
i s  the ac t of the physical body; not only i s  i t  the ac t of the veget­
a tiv e , sen sitiv e  and motive powers, but a lso  of the in te l le c t .  And so
Thomas says th a t i t  was the opinion of A ris to tle  th a t  th a t by which
25man understands i s  the form of the physical body.
The human soul i s  unique among the forms which inform m atter, in
th a t i t  i s  able to  su b s is t in  i t s  own esse while the other forms are 
able to  subsis t only in  the esse of th e ir  composites. This i s  so, 
Thomas says, because only ex is tin g  th ings ac t and th e i r  action  i s  pro­
portioned to  th e ir  e sse . Since understanding and w illin g , which are 
the proper ac tions of the human soul, take place without the  organs of 
the body, then esse must be ascribed to  the human soul as subsisting  
apart frcm m atter. Even though the soul su b sis ts  in  i t s  own esse i t  
a lso  communicates th is  esse to  corporeal m atter to  form one th in g , a 
man, 27 The esse of the soul i s  a lso  the esse of the composite, and 
a f te r  the d isso lu tio n  of the body, the soul re ta in s  i t s  own e sse .
Because i t  i s  the nature of a s p ir i tu a l  substance to  su b s is t in  
i t s  own e sse , and because i t  i s  the nature of a form to  have i t s  esse 
in  some subject which i s  the m atter of which i t  i s  the ac t and p e rfec t­
ion , i t  would seem to  be against the nature of a s p ir i tu a l  substance to
25 De U nitate In te l le c tu s . p. 209, column b; Anima e s t primum . . ,
26 De P o t.,  q. 3, a . 9, c . ;  Prima e s t ,  quia r a t io n a l i s . . . .
27 Sum. Theol. I ,  q , 76, a . 1, ad 5; see a lso : De S p ir . G reat. . 
a . 2, ad 3.
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28be the form of a body. But in  the case of human knowledge Thomas 
says i t  i s  obvious th a t understanding belongs to  some p a r tic u la r  man. 
Every a c t iv i ty  though belongs to  a p a r tic u la r  th ing  through e ith e r  a 
su b s tan tia l or an acciden ta l form ex is tin g  in  the th ing  i t s e l f .  So the 
p rincip le  of the operation of understanding must be form ally present in  
a p a r tic u la r  man. The a c t iv i ty  of understanding goes beyond m atter en­
t i r e ly  because i t  does not take place through a corporeal organ.. The 
esse of the human soul then, being proportioned to  i t s  a c t iv i ty ,  sur­
passes corporeal m atter and i s  not to ta l ly  included in  i t .  In so f a r  
as the human soul surpasses the esse of corporeal m atter and su b sis ts  
and operates in  i t s e l f ,  i t  i s  a s p ir i tu a l  substance. But in  so f a r  as
i t  i s  touched upon by m atter in  communicating i t s  own esse to  the  body,
29the human soul i s  the form of the body.
S t. Thomas pursues th is  point in  much g rea ter d e ta i l  and a t  g rea t 
length in  the Summa Contra G en tiles. Book I I .  Here, Thomas f i r s t  says 
th a t the union of an in te l le c tu a l  substance with a body cannot be by 
way of mixture or by way of bodily contact because these ways of union 
are proper only to  substances having corporeal m atter. However, he 
goes on to  say th a t an in te l le c tu a l  substance can be united to  a body 
by way of a contact of power which d if fe rs  frcm bodily contact in  th ree  
ways. F i r s t ,  by a contact of power, something in d iv is ib le  can touch 
something d iv is ib le  in so fa r as i t  i s  able to  ac t upon i t ,  a s , fo r  ex­
ample, when an in te l le c tu a l  substance a c ts  on a body. But by bodily
28 De S p ir . Great. . a . 2, c . î  Dicendum quod d i f f ic u l té s  h u iu s . . . .
29 De S p ir . G reat. . a . 2, c . î  Sed tamen s i  quis d ilig e n te r  consid­
é râ t . . . .  In quantum vero a t t in g i tu r  a m ateria e t esse suum communicat 
i l l i  e s t  corporis forma. See a lso î De Unitate In te l le c tu s . pp. 211-12î 
Qucmodo autem hoc esse p o ss it quod anima s i t  forma corporis.
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con tact, an in d iv is ib le  point i s  able to  touch only something e lse
which i s  in d iv is ib le . Second, bodily contact is  a t  the ex trem ities
only, vdiile in  a contact of power one thing touches the whole of the
other according as th a t th in g  i s  in  p o te n tia l i ty  to  be acted upon.
P o te n tia li ty  regards the whole of a th ing , not ju s t  the ex trem ities .
Third, in  a contact of power, th a t which touches another penetrates to  the
innermost depths of the th ing . The touching substance i s  w ithin  the
th ing  touched; while in  bodily contact a t the  ex trem ities, there  i s  no
in te rp en e tra tio n ,
A union through a contact of power does not make a th ing  to  be
unqualified ly  one, as Thomas poin ts out; but ra th e r  the two th ings so
united are one only in  respect to  acting  and being acted upon.^^ Since
to  be acting  ( esse agens) i s  not the same as to  be, simply ( esse slm-
p l i c i t e r ), then a th in g  one in  acting  i s  not one unqualified ly . A
th ing  q u a lif ie d ly  one can be spoken of in  th ree  d iffe re n t ways: as
in d iv is ib le , as continuous, and as one in  reason. The f i r s t  two kinds
of un ity  are  incompatible with the union of an in te l le c tu a l  substance
and a body because no composite can be one in d iv is ib ly ; and because the
p a rts  of something continuous are p a rts  of quan tity . F ina lly  Thomas
says th a t frcm two permanent th ings (ex duobus permanentibus) a th ing
one in  reason can re s u l t  only i f  one i s  to  the other as su b s tan tia l
form i s  to  m atter. This poses the c ru c ia l question; i s  i t  possib le  fo r
32an in te l le c tu a l  substance to  be the su b stan tia l form of a body?
Now fo r  one th ing  to  be the su b s tan tia l form of another, two
30 Cont. Gent. I I ,  c. 56; Est autem primo m anifestum ....
31 Ib id . Î Quae autem uniuntur secundum talem contactum.. . .
32 Ib id . Î Hoc ig i tu r  inquirendum re lin q u itu r , utrum substan tia  
in te l le c tu a l is  corporis a lic u iu s  forma su b s ta n tia lis  esse p o ss it .
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conditions must be f u l f i l l e d .  F i r s t ,  the form must be the p rin c ip le  of 
the su b s tan tia l being ( essendi s u b s ta n t ia l i te r ) of the th ing  whose form 
i t  i s .  That i s ,  i t  must be the formal p rinc ip le  by which a th ing  
e x is ts  and i s  called  a being. Second, the  form and m atter must be
united  in  one ac t of being (im uno esse) . The composite of m atter and
form, the composite substance must subsis t in  th is  one sing le  ac t of 
being .33
Before giving h is  own so lu tion , Thomas re la te s  five  objections 
to  th is  way of un itin g  the soul and the body. The f i r s t  ob jection  holds 
th a t both the in te l le c tu a l  substance and the body are a c tu a lly  e x is tin g  
substances and since the ac t of one th ing  d is tingu ishes i t  from another, 
frcm two ac tu a lly  e x is tin g  substances one th ing  cannot be made. Next, 
the form and m atter of a substance must be of the same genus, which i s  
not the case w ith an in te l le c tu a l  substance and a body. Third, a form 
whose esse i s  in  m atter i s  a m ateria l form, and so an in te l le c tu a l  sub­
stance as a form with esse in  a body would not be im m aterial. The
fourth  objection m aintains th a t  i t  i s  impossible fo r  something whose 
esse i s  in  a body to  be separate from the body. But since the in te l le c t  
i s  separate from the body, i t  can in  no way be the form of the body.
The f i f t h  and f in a l  objection re la ted  here i s  th a t a th ing  whose esse 
i s  in  common with a body must a lso  have i t s  operation in  common with a 
body. An in te l le c tu a l  substance then which i s  a lso  the form of a body 
must have i t s  esse common to  both i t  and the body, since a composite 
e x is ts  in  one a c t of being. The operation of such an in te l le c tu a l  sub­
stance then w il l  be in  common with the operation of the body, and
33 Cont. Gent. I I ,  c , 68: Ad hoc enim quod a liq u id  s i t  fo rm a...
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i t s  power w ill be a power of the body,^^
Thomas gives th ree  arguments to  show th a t the soul i s  united 
to  the body as i t s  su b s ta n tia l form. The form and ac t of anything i s  
th a t by which i t  becomes a being in  ac t from a being in  potency. The 
body becomes a being in  ac t frcm a being in  potency by means of the 
soul because, as Thomas says; to  liv e  i s  the esse of a liv in g  th ing .
The soul then, since i t  makes the body to  be liv in g  in  a c t ,  i s  the 
form of the ensouled body.
In h is  second argument, Thomas says th a t esse and operation belong 
to  the composite of m atter and form and to  ne ither the form nor the 
m atter alone. Thomas hence a tt r ib u te s  to  be ( esse) and to  ac t (agere)
to  two things which are re la ted  one to  the other as form i s  to  m atter.
For example, a man i s  said to  be healthy in  body and in  h ea lth , and he 
i s  said to  know in  knowledge and in  h is  soul. But knowledge i s  a form 
of the knowsr's soul vdiile health  i s  a form of the healthy body. Sim­
i la r ly  Thcmas a tt r ib u te s  l i f e  and sensation to  both the soul and the 
body. But, he says, the soul i s  the p rin c ip le  of l i f e  and the senses, 
and so therefore  i t  i s  the form of the body.
F in a lly  Thomas says th a t the whole sensitive  soul i s  re la ted  to  
the vAiole body as a part i s  re la te d  to  a p a rt. And he says a part i s
re la ted  to  a part in  such manner as to  be i t s  form and a c t, a s , fo r
example, sigh t i s  the form and act of the eye. Thus the soul i s  the
form and act of the body.
Thomas notes the objection th a t since diverse genera have
34 Ib id . , c. 56; Videtur autem ra t io n a b i l i te r  consideran tibus.. . .
35 Cont. Gent. I I ,  c. 57: Quod autem u t forma p r o p r ia , . . .
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diverse modes of being, an in te l le c tu a l  substance cannot be united  to  
corporeal m atter in  the same act of being, but ra th e r should have a 
more noble mode of being. Thomas re je c ts  th is  by saying th a t corporeal 
m atter and in te l le c tu a l  substance do not possess the sing le  ac t of 
being in  the same way. For esse i s  received in to  corporeal m atter as 
in to  a subject which i s  ra ised  to  a higher level than ju s t  elemental 
m atter; while esse i s  the p rinc ip le  of the in te l le c tu a l  substance, in  
keeping w ith i t s  own nature . And so frcsn th is  d ifference  in  the 
re la tio n sh ip  between esse and corporeal m atter, and esse and in te l le c tu a l  
substance, Thomas concludes th a t nothing prevents an in te l le c tu a l  sub­
stance from being the form of the human body; and th is  form is  the 
human soul.^^
The composite o f human soul and body i s  a un ity  because, as
Thomas says: "The g rea te r the mastery of form over m atter, the g rea ter
37i s  the un ity  of th a t  which i s  composed of th a t form and m atter."
And from the examination of the operations of forms i t  can be seen th a t 
the higher a form i s ,  the more i t  exceeds the  lim ita tio n s  of m atter, 
and the higher i s  i t s  rank of esse . The lowest forms, those wholly 
embedded in  m atter are the forms of the four elements: e a rth , a i r ,  f i r e ,  
and w ater. The operations of these forms are lim ited  to  what i s  proper 
to  those q u a li t ie s  which are the d ispositions of m atter, fo r  example, 
heat, cold, m oisture, dryness, e tc . S lig h tly  higher are the forms of 
mixed bodies whose operations, while mostly dependent on the q u a li t ie s  
of m atter, yet produce seme e ffe c ts  by a higher power, which Thomas
36 Cent. Gent. I I ,  c. 68: P o test autem o b iic i quod s u b s ta n t ia . . . .
37 Ib id . ; . . .  quia quanto forma magis v in c it  materiam, ex ea e t 
m ateria e f f ic i tu r  magis unum.
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says i s  received from a heavenly body, fo r  example, the a ttra c tio n  
of a magnet fo r iro n . Higher yet than these  are the forms which are 
the l i f e  p rin c ip le s  of p lan ts . The operations of p lan t forms exceed 
the q u a li t ie s  of elemental m atter in  th a t  they are p rin c ip le s  of move­
ment in  liv in g  th ings th a t move themselves: although the q u a li t ie s  of 
the elemental m atter do a s s is t  o rganically  in  the operation of the 
forms. Above the p lan t soul there  next comes the sen sitiv e  soul of 
the bru te  animal. This sensitive  soul, Thomas says, not only i s  a 
p rin c ip le  of motion but a lso  of a form of knowing. Hence the souls 
of brute animals are capable of operations to  which the q u a li t ie s  of 
elemental m atter are no assistance  even organically , although the 
operations are  performed only by means of the bodily organs. Thomas 
b r ie f ly  explains th is  by saying th a t sensation and imagination are 
not brought about by heating or cooling, or any other q u a lity , but 
th a t these q u a li t ie s  are necessary d ispositions of the organs in ­
volved in  sensing.
F in a lly  Thomas says there  i s  a form which i s  lik e  the higher 
substances not only by being a p rin c ip le  of motion but also  as to  the 
type of i t s  knowledge, namely understanding. This form, the in te l le c t ­
ive soul, i s  capable of an operation which to ta l ly  surpasses the bodily  
organs. Hence the in te l le c t iv e  soul of man, by which he understands 
and which transcends a l l  the conditions of corporeal m atter, i s  not
•3 0
wholly embedded in  m atter as m ateria l forms a re .^ ' Though the operat-
38 Cont. Gent. I I ,  c . 68.
39 Ib id . i  Super omnes autem has formas inven itu r.
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ion of understanding requ ires no bodily organs i t  s t i l l  depends on 
the powers of sense and imagination fo r  knowledge of ind iv idua l th in g s . 
The soul i s  not endowed by nature with the  knowledge of t ru th , as i s  
an angel, but must acquire i t  through the senses, which operate through 
bodily organs. This shows th a t i t  i s  na tu ra l fo r  the soul to  be united  
to  the body.
A fter presenting h is  position  on the union of the soul and body, 
Thomas sp e c if ic a lly  answers the five  objections ra ised  above to  the 
soul being the form of the body. The f i r s t  he dism isses as a fa lse  
supposition. The soul and body are not two ac tu a lly  e x is tin g  sub­
stances, but ra th e r  together they form one ac tu a lly  e x is tin g  substance. 
The presence or absence of the soul makes a d ifference to  the body 
because the soul makes i t  to  be ac tu a lly  a human body. The second 
objection Thomas says would be v a lid  i f  the in te l le c tu a l  substance and 
the body did e x is t apart because then they would indeed be species of 
diverse genera. However by being un ited , the soul and the body are of 
the same genus in  the sense th a t they are the p rin c ip le s  of th a t genus. 
The th ird  objection has been answered above when Thomas showed how the 
in te l le c tu a l  sou l, though being a form of m atter was not wholly immersed 
in  m atter and so was not a m ateria l form. To the fourth  objection 
Thomas answers th a t fo r  the in te l le c t  to  be separate means th a t i f  the 
so u l 's  operation i s  not carried  out by means of a bodily  organ then 
i t s  power w ill  not be the  a c t of a body. Any operation th a t i s  carried  
out by means of a bodily organ, fo r  example, seeing, i s  the a c t of a 
power of th a t organ. But through the essence of the soul, the soul 
gives esse to  a body. So even though the soul i s  separate from m atter 
in  i t s  power of in te l le c t io n , s t i l l  i t  i s  un ited  to  the body in  i t s
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essence as the form of the body. To the f i f th  objection Thomas answers 
th a t fo r  the substance of the soul to  be the fom  of a body does not 
mean every power of the soul w ill  be the ac t of a bodily th ing . And 
th is  he showed when he proved th a t the human soul was not a form em­
bedded in  m atter.
The soul i s  united  to  the body fo r two main reasons. The f i r s t  
i s  to  make a complete human being; and the second i s  to  p erfec t the 
soul in  in te l le c tu a l  k n o w l e d g e . N o  p a rt has the perfec tion  of a 
nature when i t  i s  separated from the vdiole. And so the soul which i s  
pa rt of human nature , does not have the perfection  even of i t s  own 
nature except in  union w ith the body. This can be seen because the 
soul does not have the perfec tion  of i t s  nature u n til  i t  i s  able to  
ac tu a lize  a l l  of i t s  v i r tu a l ly  contained powers. And since many of the 
powers of the soul are ac ts  of the organs of the body i t  can ac tu a lize
42them only in  union with the body. "The soul so much occupies the 
lowest lev e l among the in te l le c tu a l  substances th a t i t  does not nat­
u ra lly  possess the tru th  and must s tr iv e  fo r and gather knowledge from 
indiv idual th ings by way of the senses." The in te l le c tu a l  soul then 
had to  be endowed not only with the power of understanding but a lso  
with the power of sensing. Since the power of sensing needs corporeal
40 Cont. Gent. I I ,  c. 69: His autem considera tis  non e s t 
d i f f i c i l e . . . ,
41 2* 2» Ë® Anima, a . 1 , ad 7.
42 De S p ir. Great. . a . 2, ad 5»
43 Sum. Theol. I ,  q. 76, a . 5, c . : Anima autem in te l le c t iv e  
secundum naturae ordinem, infimum gradum in  su b s ta n tiis  in te l le c tu a l-  
ibus te n e t;  intantum quod non habet n a tu ra li te r  s ib i inditam  notitiam  
v e r i t a t i s  . . .  sed oportet quod earn c o llig a t ex rebus d iv is ib il ib u s  per 
viam sensus . . . .
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organs fo r  i t s  operations, the soul then had to  be united  to  a body
which could be the f i t t i n g  organ of sense.
Because the soul i s  the substan tia l form of the body Thomas
says th a t of necessity  i t  i s  in  the whole body and in  each part of the
body. This i s  so because the su b s tan tia l form p e rfec ts  both the whole 
and each part of the whole of which i t  i s  the form. A whole i s  made up 
of p a rts  and i f  the form of the whole did not give esse to  each of the 
p a rts  of the  body, i t  would be a form lik e  the form of a house, con­
s is t in g  in  composition and order; i t  would be an acc iden ta l form.
But since the soul i s  a su b s tan tia l form of the body i t  i s  the form 
and a c t of the vdiole body and of each of i t s  p a rts . I f  the soul i s  the 
ac t of each part of the body and an ac t i s  in  the th ing  of which i t  i s  
the a c t ,  then the soul by i t s  essence i s  in  each part of the body.
An i l lu s t r a t io n  i s  th a t  upon the separation of the soul from the body, 
no part of the body re ta in s  i t s  proper work; and the body i t s e l f  i s
only so -called  equivocally, as i s ,  fo r  in stance , the body of a painted 
44animal,
Thomas says th a t the soul i s  re la ted  in  one way to  the whole 
body and in  another way to  i t s  p a rts . The soul i s  prim arily  and essen­
t i a l l y  the ac t of the whole body, but i t  i s  a lso  the ac t of the p a rts  
in  th e ir  re la tio n  to  the whole. Thomas c la r i f ie s  th is  by saying th a t 
since m atter i s  fo r  the sake of form, the m atter has to  be such as 
s u its  the form. The lower types of forms of th ings are of weaker power 
and have few a c t iv i t ie s  and few d iffe ren t p a rts , as in  inanimate bodies. 
The soul, however, i s  a higher form with g rea ter powers. I t  can be the
44 Sum. Theol. I ,  q. 76, a . 8, c . i  Sed quia anima un itu r 
c o rp o r i .. . .
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p rincip le  of many d if fe re n t a c t iv i t ie s ,  each of which requ ires a d i f f ­
eren t organ of the body. The more p erfec t the soul, the g rea te r i s  
the d iv e rs ity  in  organs requ ired . The lowest forms perfec t th e i r  
m atter in  a uniform way, while the  soul perfec ts  i t s  m atter in  a non- 
uniform way, so th a t the whole of the body of which the soul i s  primar­
i ly  and e s se n tia lly  the a c t ,  i s  made up of d iss im ila r p a rts .
To show th a t the soul i s  e n tire  in  each p a rt of the body, Thomas 
examines the th ree  types of p a rts  in to  which a whole can be divided and 
the th ree  types of t o ta l i ty  corresponding to  these p a r ts . There i s  a 
whole which can be divided in to  p a rts  of quan tity , lik e  a whole lin e  or 
a whole body. Another type of whole can be divided in to  lo g ica l and 
e s se n tia l  p a r ts , a s , fo r  instance, a th ing  which has been defined i s  
divided in to  the p a rts  of a d e fin itio n ; and a composite i s  divided in to  
m atter and form. T hirdly a th ing  can be a to ta l i ty  in  re la tio n  to  i t s  
ac tive  and passive powers, inasmuch as these are considered to  be p a rts  
of i t  which are d istinguished fran  one another because th e ir  operations
d if f e r .
As an i l lu s t r a t io n ,  Thomas considers a l l  th ree  types of whole 
with respect to  whiteness in  a surface. The q u an tita tiv e  whole which 
whiteness has acc iden ta lly  i s  not in  each p a rt of a surface which i s  
white. Nor i s  the p o ten tia l whole of whiteness in  each part of a sur­
face since whiteness in  the whole surface a ffe c ts  the eye more than the 
whiteness in  a small pa rt of i t .  However the wholeness of the species
in
and essence of whiteness i s  in  each p a rt of the surface.
45 De S p ir. Great. , a . 4, c . : Sed tamen a l i t e r  se habet to tum .. . .
46 Sum. Theol. I ,  q . 76, a . 8, c . : Et quod to ta  s i t  in  q u a lib e t.. .
47 Ib id .:  Primus autem to ta l i t a s  modus non convenit form is.
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The q u a n tita tiv e  whole app lies to  forms only acc iden ta lly  
because, fo r  example, w hiteness, which in  i t s  essence i s  equally 
disposed to  be in  a whole surface and in  each part of i t ,  i s  divided 
acc id en ta lly  when the surface i s  divided. But the soul of a p e rfec t 
animal which requires v a rie ty  in  the p a rts  of the animal i s  not equally- 
disposed to  be in  the whole and in  the p a rts , and so i t  i s  not divided 
acc iden ta lly  through the d iv is io n  of quan tity . The soul i s  not a quan­
t i t a t i v e  whole e ith e r  acc iden ta lly  or e sse n tia lly .
Nor i s  the soul in  every p a rt of the body from the viewpoint of 
a wholeness of power because the p a rts  are perfected in  d iffe re n t ways 
by the soul i t s e l f  fo r  d if fe re n t a c t i v i t i e s . A n d  one a c t iv i ty  of the 
soul, understanding, i s  performed without any part o f the body. Hence 
by power, the soul i s  not wholly in  every part nor even wholly in  the 
body. With respect to  any one power the soul e x is ts  only in  th a t part 
of the body which takes care of the operations exercised by th a t  p a rt­
ic u la r  part.^^
Whole and p a rt, taken q u a n tita tiv e ly , p e rta in  to  forms only 
acc id en ta lly  in so fa r as the forms are divided when the q u an tita tiv e  sub­
je c t  in  which they reside i s  d i v i d e d . B u t  whole and part as applied 
to  the perfection  of the essence are found in  forms e s se n tia lly . With 
respect to  th is  type of t o ta l i ty ,  which belongs to  forms e s se n tia lly , 
the whole of every form i s  in  the whole subject and the whole of i t  
in  each p a rt , ju s t  as whiteness by i t s  to ta l  essence i s  in  a whole body
48 De S p ir . Great. , a . 4, c . : R elinquitur ergo quod secundum.
49 Q. D. ^  Anima, a . 10, c . : Unde secundum illam  potentiam tan ­
tum e s t in  aliqua parte  quae re s p ic i t  operationem quae per illam  partem 
corporis exercetur.
50 Cont. Gent. I I ,  c. 72: Totum autem e t pars secundum quantitatem .
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and i t s  every p a rt. The soul by i t s  essence is  the form of the body 
and i t  e x is ts  as such in  each part of the body because the perfection  
of the  species comes fron  the soul in  v irtu e  of i t s  very essence.
So the whole soul e x is ts  in  each p a rt of the body according to  the 
whole of i t s  sp ec ific  perfection .
To sum up then , by soul Thomas means the f i r s t  p rinc ip le  of 
l i f e  in  bodies which are p o te n tia lly  a liv e . The soul i s  th a t by which 
the body l iv e s , and as such i s  the ac t of the  body. I t  i s  the f i r s t  
a c t, by which the body has e s se , and which underlies a l l  i t s  operations. 
But anything i s  in  ac t only by means of i t s  form. The soul then i s  the 
su b s tan tia l form of the body, making i t  to be what i t  i s ,  ex is tin g  in  
a l l  of the body's p a rts . Much e ffo r t  was spent by Thomas to  show how 
the soul was e s se n tia lly  a form and a c t. The concern of th is  th e s is  
though i s  the powers of the sou l, and so the manner in  which the soul 
can be in  potency i s  extremely re levan t. However i t  w ill  remain to  a 
l a te r  section  to  t r e a t  of th is .
51 £ . D. ^  Anima, a. 10, c . : Dicimus ergo quod, cum p e rfec tio  
speciei p e rtin ea t ad animam secundum suam essentiam, anima autem 
secundum suam essentiam e s t forma corporis e t prout e s t  forma corporis 
e s t in  qua libe t parte  corporis, . . . r e l in q u i tu r  quod anima to ta  s i t  in  
qualibet parte  corporis secundum to ta lita te m  p e rfec tio n is  sp ec ie i.
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IV THE POTERS AS ACCIDENTS
S t. Thomas s ta r te d  h is  d iscussion of the re la tio n sh ip  between 
the powers and the essence of the soul by saying two viewpoints were 
held concerning i t .  In the course of presenting the viewpoint which 
id e n tif ie d  the powers with the soul, i t  was noticed th a t P eter the 
Lombard held th a t the memory, understanding, and w ill  were d iffe re n t 
from the soul, and th a t he gave the name "natu ra l p roperties"  to  these 
powers. But William of Auvergne vehemently objected to  any notion of 
accidents being in  the soul. The sim p lic ity  of the sou l, he said , 
demanded th a t the whole soul in  i t s  essence be the p rin c ip le  of each 
and every human ac tio n . However, S t. Thomas, in  the course of demolish­
ing the theory th a t made the essence of the soul the immediate p rin c ip le  
of i t s  operations showed th a t the p rinc ip les of the so u l 's  operations 
had to  be acciden ta l p rin c ip le s . I t  now remains to  say in  what way 
Thomas means the powers to  be accidents of the soul, and in  what way 
they are p roperties of i t .
I t  i s  true  or fa lse  to  say the powers are e sse n tia l or n a tu ra l 
p roperties of the soul according to  which one of two senses of the 
term accident i s  used,^ In  one sense accident i s  used in  opposition 
to  substance and includes the nine categories of A ris to tle ;  quan tity ,
2q u a lity , re la tio n , p lace, tim e, p o sitio n , s ta te , a c t iv i ty ,  p a ss iv ity .
1 De S p ir. Great. . a . 11, c . : Quod quidem concedentes d icunt.
2 A r is to tle , Topica. I ,  9, (103 b21-24), (See Bibliography).
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In  th is  sense, Thomas says th a t a power cannot be a na tu ra l or essen t­
i a l  property because there can be nothing interm ediate between sub­
stance and acciden t. Substance and accident, he goes on, a re  divided 
by affirm ation  and negation, th a t i s ,  according as they are  in  a sub­
je c t or not in  a subject ( secundtm esse in  subiecto e t non esse in 
subiecto) . I t  i s  proper fo r  a substance not to  be in  a sub ject,
3
since i t  i s  a sub jec t; while an accident must e x is t  in  sane sub jec t.
The powers were shown above not to  be the essence of the soul and th a t 
they must be acciden ts . But because property is  not included in  the 
nine categories of accidents, the powers cannot be considered as na tu ra l 
p roperties of the soul. What Thomas means by property w ill  be fully- 
explained below, but b r ie f ly  he means i t  i s  something th a t does not 
belong to  the essence of a th ing , and ye t is  caused by the e sse n tia l 
p rinc ip le  of the species and cannot be considered in  separation fran  i t .  
Because a property i s  not the same as the essence of a th ing , and because 
i t  is  not included among the nine categories of acciden ts, a power can­
not be considered as a na tu ra l property of the soul when i t  i s  con­
sidered to  be an accident in  th is  f i r s t  sense of the term.
Thomas goes on to  conclude then th a t the powers are accidents 
included under one of the nine ca teg o ries .^  Moreover he says they are 
accidents of the second species of q u a lity  which i s  called  n a tu ra l 
power or n a tu ra l impotence.^
3 De S p ir . G reat. . a . 11, c . ; Sic autem accipiendo a c c id e n s ...
4 Ib id . ; . . .s e q u i tu r  quod [p o ten tiae  animae] s in t acc iden tia  in  
novem generum contenta.
5 Ib id . ; Sunt enim in  secunda ^ e c i e  q u a l i ta t is ,  quae d ic i tu r  
poten tia  v e l im potentia n a tu ra lis .  ^ I ta l i c s  mine].
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Thomas re fe rs  here to  A r is to t le 's  d e fin itio n  of the species of 
q u a lity . For A ris to tle  a q u a lity  i s  th a t  in  v irtue  of which people 
are  said to  be such and such; and under the second of the four c lasses  
of q u a lity  he considers, he "includes a l l  those terms which re fe r  to
7
inborn capacity  or incapac ity . " A ris to tle  i l lu s t r a te s  h is  words by 
saying good boxers and good runners are so because of some inborn cap­
a c ity  to  accomplish th e i r  tasks with ease, and not because they have 
such and such a d isp o sitio n .
S t. Thomas goes on to  h is  own consideration of q u a lity , saying 
th a t i t  im plies a ce rta in  mode of substance, which mode im plies a cer-
g
ta in  determ ination according to  some measures. And so he says th a t in  
the same way th a t a q u a lity , which i s  a d ifference of a substance, i s  
said to  determine the potency of m atter according to  i t s  su b s tan tia l 
e sse , so an acciden ta l q u a lity , which i s  a lso  a ce rta in  kind of d i f f ­
erence, determines the potency of a subject to  i t s  acc iden ta l e s se .9 
Thomas eaqilains the  use of the term q u a lity  as substan tia l d ifference 
to  mean "the difference by which one th ing  i s  d istinguished  substant­
i a l ly  from another and which i s  included in  the d e fin itio n  of the sub-
6 Sum. Theol. I - I I ,  q. 49, a . 2, c . : see A ris to tle , C ategories, 
8, (8 b25- 10 a25), (See Bibliography).
7 A r is to tle , C ategoriae, 8, (9 a14). ^ I ta l ic s  mine].
8 Sum. Theol. I - I I ,  iq. 49, a . 2, c . : Proprie enim q u a lité s  
im p o rtâ t,. . .
9 Ib id . ; Et ideo s icu t id  secundum quod determ inatur po ten tia  
m ateriae secundum esse su b s tan tia le , d ic i tu r  q u a lité s  quae e s t  d i f f e r ­
en tia  substan tiae; i t a  id  secundum quod determ inatur po ten tia  su b iec ti 
secundum esse accidentale  d ic i tu r  q u a lité s  acc id en ta lis  quae e s t etiam 
quaedam d if fe re n tia .
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s t a n c e . For example, man i s  said to  be a two-footed kind of 
animal; while a horse i s  a four-footed kind.
Thomas continues by saying th a t the determ ination of a subject 
to  be acc iden ta lly  can be taken in  one sense according to  the action  and 
passion which follow on the p rinc ip les  of i t s  na tu re , namely, m atter 
and form. This determ ination of a sub ject according to  action  and 
passion happens respec tive ly  in  the second and th ird  species of q u a lity . 
Thomas has said in  e f f e c t ,  th a t the second species of q u a lity  d e te r­
mines an e x is tin g  subject to  act in  sane way, acc iden ta lly .^^
Thomas c la r i f ie s  h is notion of second species of q u a lity  when he 
says th a t th is  q u a lity  i s  proper to  c reatu res alone. Creatures do not 
act immediately by th e i r  essence as does God; ra th e r they ac t by the
medium of acciden ta l forms which are powers of the  second species of
1 12 q u a lity .
When power is  considered to  be an accident in  the f i r s t  sense of 
the term, th a t i s ,  when i t  i s  considered to  be in  the second species 
of q u a lity , i t  i s  impossible fo r  i t  to  be called a n a tu ra l property of 
the soul. In  what sense then i s  i t  possible to  say the powers are 
p roperties of the soul? To find  out, Thomas examines the second sense 
of the term acciden t, th a t sense which he says i s  one of the  four pre­
d icables which A ris to tle  mentions, namely, d e fin itio n , property , genus
10 In Metaphysicam A ris to te l is  Commentaria. V, l e c t .  16, n. 987, 
(See Bibliography, Thomas Aquinas, S a in t, 18): . . .  d if fe re n tia  subst­
a n tiae , id e s t  d if fe re n tia  per quam a liq u id  ab a lte ro  s u b s ta n tia l i te r  
d i f f e r t ,  quae in t r a t  in  definitionem  substan tiae . ^H ereafter 
abbreviated In MetaphTJ
11 Sum. Theol. I - I I ,  q. 49, a . 2, c.
12 De P o t. . q. 1, a . 1, ad 11.
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13and acciden t; and which i s  a lso  one of the five  un iverse ls  Porphyry 
gives in  IV Isagoge, namely, property, d iffe ren ce , genus, species, and 
a c c id e n t ,^  A ris to tle  says th a t a d e fin itio n  i s  a phrase which sig­
n if ie s  the essence of a th ing ;^^  and th a t "a property is  a predicate 
which does not ind icate  the essence of a th in g , but yet belongs to  
th a t th ing  alone, and is  predicated convertibly of i t . " ^ ^  A ris to tle  
has here se t up th ree  conditions which must be sa t is f ie d  i f  one 
th ing  i s  to be a property of another. He' i l lu s t r a te s  these th ree  con­
d itio n s  by the  example of a man's a b i l i ty  to  lea rn  grammar. This 
a b i l i ty  c e rta in ly  does not ind ica te  the essence of man, but i t  does 
belong to  man alone; and i t  i s  convertible because as A ris to tle  says, 
i f  A i s  a man he can learn  grammar, and conversely i f  A can learn  
grammar he i s  a man. He emphasizes th a t nothing which could belong 
to  something outside of A i s  convertib le with A, fo r example, a man can 
sleep , but what can sleep does not have to  be a man. Sleep then s t r i c t l y  
speaking i s  not a property of man. I f  man i s  the only th ing  sleeping 
a t  a p a rtic u la r  time then sleep i s  what A ris to tle  c a lls  a temporary 
property of man; or i f  man i s  not alone when sleeping A ris to tle  c a lls  
h is sleep a re la tiv e  property, th a t i s ,  r e la tiv e  to  those creatures 
not sleeping.
S t. Thomas o ffe rs  two examples to  c la r ify  the notions of absolute 
and re la tiv e  p ro p erties . R is ib i l i ty  i s  an absolute property of man 
because i t  belongs to him alone; while r a t io n a li ty  i s  a property fo r
13 A ris to tle , Topica, I ,  4, (101 b l7 ).
14 De S p ir . G reat. , a . 11, c . : Alio modo a c c ip itu r  a c c id e n s ...
15 A ris to tle , Topica, I ,  5, (101 b36).
16 Ib id . .  (102 a lS ).
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1 7man only re la tiv e  to , say, a horse, because angels a lso  are ra tio n a l. 
A ris to tle  goes on to  define genus as th a t which i s  predicated
in  the category of essence of several th ings exh ib iting  d iffe ren ces in  
18kind. Then he gives two d e fin itio n s  of accident: one, a process of
elim ination  has accident belonging to  a th ing  and yet not being
d e fin itio n , property, or genus; the second says accident may belong
19or not belong to  any one and the self-same th ing . As an i l lu s t r a t io n  
of an accident he says whiteness may belong or not belong to  the  s e lf ­
same th in g . Nothing prevents the th ing  from a t  one time being white 
and a t  another time not being w hite.
For A ris to tle  an accident could be a re la tiv e  or temporary prop­
e rty  but never an absolute property. For example, s i t t in g  posture i s  
an accident in  man but also i s  a temporary property i f  he alone i s  
s i t t in g ;  or i f  he i s  not alone i t  i s  a property re la tiv e  to  those men 
not s i t t in g .  However no accident w ill  f u l f i l l  the three conditions 
necessary to  be an absolute property. A fter th is  p resen ta tion  of the 
meanings of the four predicables A ris to tle  says th a t they are never­
th e le ss  reducible to  the ten  ca tego ries:
Next then we must d is tin g u ish  between the c lasses of pre­
d ica tes in  which the four orders in  question are found. These 
are ten  in  number: Essence, Q uantity, Q uality , R elation ,
P lace, Time, P osition , S ta te , A ctiv ity , P ass iv ity . For the 
accident and genus and property and d e fin itio n  of any th ing  
w ill  always be in  one of these categories: fo r  a l l  the 
propositions found through these sign ify  e i th e r  something's 
essence or i t s  q u a lity  or quan tity  or some one of the other
types of p re d ic a te .20
17 De P o t., q. 10, a. 4, ad 7: Sed proprium d u p l ic i te r . . .
18 A risj^ptle, Topica, I ,  5, (102 a32).
19 A ris to tle , Topica. I ,  5, (102 b4-7).
20 Ib id . . 9, (103 b20-28).
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This lengthy d ig ression  in to  A r is to t le 's  meaning concerning 
accident and property was necessary to  see ju s t how Thomas was using 
the term s. Thomas continues h is  discussion by saying th a t the second 
sense of the term accident s ig n if ie s  the acciden ta l re la tio n sh ip  of a 
predicate to  a sub jec t. Using th is  second sense of acc iden t, S t. 
Thomas places property as a medium between the su b s ta n tia l and the 
acciden ta l p red ica tes . By a medium Thomas means th a t in  the order 
of h ierarchy, property i s  above the acc iden ta l p redicate  and below the 
su b s tan tia l p red ica te , and a lso  th a t in  some ways property i s  sim ilar 
to  both pred icates and in  seme ways d if fe re n t . Thomas explains th a t a 
property i s  s im ila r to  a su b s tan tia l predicate  because both are caused 
by the e sse n tia l p rin c ip les  of the species: from th i s ,  by a d e fin itio n  
signifying the essence, a property can be demonstrated as belonging 
to  a sub ject. Also Thomas says a property, since i t  is  scmething out­
side of the  essence of a th ing , i s  lik e  an acciden ta l p red ica te . But 
he says a property d if fe rs  from an acciden ta l predicate because the 
acciden ta l p red icate  i s  not caused by the e sse n tia l p rin c ip le s  of a 
species, but ra th e r  happens to  an ind iv idual th ing  the same way a prop­
e rty  happens to  a species: however sometimes i t  happens separably and
21sometimes inseparably . An inseparable accident has a permanent
cause in  the ind iv idua l sub ject, as Thomas explains, fo r  example, a
human being i s  permanently male or female, while a separable accident
has a cause which i s  not permanently in  the indiv idual sub ject, fo r
22example, to  s i t  and to  walk are not permanent.
21 De S p ir . Great. , a . 11, c . : Sic enim accidens non s ig n i-  
f ic a t  . . . .
22 g . D. ^  Anima, a . 12, ad 7.
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Thomas concludes then th a t "the powers of the soul as essen­
t i a l  p roperties  n a tu ra lly  consequent to  the essence of the soul are
23interm ediate between the essence of the soul and an acc iden t."
From h is  twofold consideration of accident Thomas concludes 
th a t the powers can be considered as being in  the nine ca tegories , 
and th a t they can be considered as n a tu ra l p roperties of the soul 
interm ediate between the  essence and an accident. However an in te r e s t ­
ing problem arose when i t  was pointed out by A ris to tle  th a t the four 
predicables are always included under one of the nine ca tegories .
Since accident and property , considered as two of the four pred icab les, 
can always be reduced to  seme of the nine ca tegories , i t  seems le g i t ­
imate to  wonder i f  power i s  considered to  be a n a tu ra l property only in  
a lo g ic a l sense. In other words, i s  a power considered in  a re a l sense 
when i t  i s  considered as an accident in  one of the nine categories? 
and i s  i t  considered only in  a lo g ica l sense when considered as a 
property in  the four predicables?
There i s  c e rta in ly  a sense in  which S t. Thomas considers the
accident which s ig n if ie s  a power, to  be re a l ,  because he says th a t
24"every power of the soul i s  a certa in  form or na tu re ."  Even more 
e x p lic i t ly  he says th a t creatures ac t "by the medium of acciden tal 
forms'* which are powers in  the second species of q u a li ty .^5 s t .
23 De S p ir . Great. . a . 11, c . : Sic ig i tu r  potentiae animae sunt 
medium in te r  essentiam animae e t accidens, quasi p ro p rie ta te s  na tu r- 
a le s  v e l e sse n tia le s , id e s t essentiam animae n a tu ra li te r  conséquentes.
24 Sum. Theol. I ,  q. 80, a. 1, ad 3: Dicendum quod unaquaeque pot­
en tia  animae e s t quaedam forma seu natura.
25 De P o t ., q. 1, a . 1, ad 11: Dicendum quod po ten tia  quae e s t 
in  secunda specie q u a l i ta t is ,  non a t t r ib u i tu r  Deo: haec enim e s t 
creaturarum quae non immediate per formas suas e sse n tia le s  agunt, sed 
mediantibus formis acciden ta libus.
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Thomas to  c a l l  a power an acc id en ta l fo ra  shows th a t in  th is  sense 
he i s  c e rta in ly  not considering the power to  have only a lo g ic a l re a l­
i ty .  Accidental forms have th e i r  own d e fin ite  mode of being in  making 
substances to  be in  such and such a way, and as such, the powers have 
th e ir  own d e fin ite  mode of being. That S t. Thomas indeed means th a t 
the powers are  acc iden ta l forms he affirm s again when he says: "That 
the acciden ta l fo ra  i s  a p rin c ip le  of action  i s  due to  the su b s tan tia l 
form." How pregnant i s  th is  short statement 1 I t  describes the powers 
as acc iden ta l forms, i t  gives th e ir  function as p rin c ip les  of ac tion , 
and i t  in d ica te s  th a t the su b s tan tia l form i s  the f i r s t  or remote 
p rincip le  of any operation and th a t the powers as acc iden ta l forms 
ac t only by i t .  And in  a f in a l  statement to  show th a t by the f i r s t  
sense of accident he understands a power to  have onto logical r e a l i ty ,  
Thomas se ts  up a proportion: an ac tive  acciden ta l fo ra  i s  re la te d  to  
the su b s ta n tia l fo ra  of the agent (fo r  example, heat compared to  the 
fo ra  of f i r e )  in  the same way th a t the powers of the soul are re la te d
27to  the sou l. Thomas i s  able to  se t up the proportion because a th in g  
has i t s  su b s tan tia l esse only as a re s u lt  of i t s  su b s ta n tia l fo ra , 
and because i t  operates by the power which re s u l ts  from i t s  su b s tan tia l 
fo ra . The proportion d ire c tly  expresses Thomas' notion th a t the soul 
i s  the su b s ta n tia l form of the composite, and i t  t ie s  in  the powers 
with the ac tive  acciden ta l forms. The powers as acc iden ta l forms.
26 Sum. Theol. I ,  q. 77, a . 1, ad 4: Dicendum quod hoc ipsum 
quod forma acc id e n ta lis  e s t a c tio n is  principium, habet a forma sub- 
s ta n t ia l i .
27 Sum. Theol. I ,  q. 77, a . 1, ad 3t Compositum autem per foraam 
substantialem  habet esse s u b s ta n tia l i te r ;  per virtutem  autem quae con- 
sequitur foraam s u b s ta n tia l i te r ,  operatur. Unde sic  se habet forma 
acc id en ta lis  ac tiv a  ad foraam substantialem  ag en tis , u t calor ad foraam 
ig n is , s icu t se habet po ten tia  animae ad animam.
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have ontological r e a l i ty .
I t  now remains to  see whether there  i s  any evidence to  support 
the second h a lf of the problem: the notion th a t accident in  the sec­
ond sense is  only a lo g ic a l e n tity . Support fo r the contention th a t 
i t  i s  only a lo g ic a l e n tity  could a r is e  from the very nature of the 
pred icab les, genus, species, and d iffe ren ce . These are undoubtedly
lo g ic a l terms and are spoken of only in  re la tio n  to  seme e x is tin g  sub­
je c t ,  In  th is  context i t  would seem th a t  property and the predicable 
accident here are a lso  only lo g ic a l terms.
In h is  discussion of the second sense of the term accident i t
was seen above th a t Thomas considered i t  only to  s ig n ify  the re la tio n ­
ship of a p redicate  to  a sub jec t. The re la tio n sh ip  between a subject 
and i t s  p red icates i s  a question of lo g ic  and does not n ecessarily  
correspond to  the re la tio n sh ip  between a substance and i t s  acc iden ts. 
For example, man and horse are  both in  the genus of animal. Each man 
and each horse contains the f u l l  essence of anim ality w ith in  i t s e l f .  
But there i s  no animal essence outside of the specific  animals them­
selves. Man and horse are animals. Animal i s  something said about 
the man and the horse, and without these ind iv iduals i s  nothing.
The very fa c t th a t  A ris to tle  said the predicables could be re ­
duced to  the categories in d ica te s  th a t he was considering the predic­
ables in  a sp ec ia l l ig h t .  I t  i s  reasonable to  conclude th a t th is  
specia l l ig h t  was a lo g ic a l one to  help speak of th ings in  a more 
precise manner. The two examples th a t Thomas used to  c la r ify  the 
notions of absolute and re la tiv e  p roperties strongly support the no­
tio n  th a t the second sense of the term accident i s  lo g ic a l. He says 
r i s i b i l i t y  i s  an absolute property of man, while r a t io n a l i ty  i s  only
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a re la tiv e  property, re la tiv e  to  angels. I f  property i s  something 
re a l in  man, then man no longer i s  a ra tio n a l animal prim arily : he i s  
a laughing animal. What a rev e rsa l of order 1 But i f  the  notion of 
property i s  only lo g ic a l, and meant to  a id  in  subtle d is t in c tio n s , the 
re s u lt  here i s  not too im portant.
There indeed seems to  be so lid  ground then fo r  the contention 
th a t  Thomas* notion of power as an accident in  the f i r s t  sense has 
ontological r e a l i ty ,  while in  the second sense i t  has only lo g ic a l 
r e a l i ty .
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V THE DISTINCTION OF THE POWERS BY THEIR ACTS AND O^BJECTS
The problem of d is tingu ish ing  the  powers i s  the th ird  and l a s t  
of the major problems concerning the powers of the soul th a t  were r a i s ­
ed by those vAio maintained the Id e n tity  of the soul and i t s  powers. 
William o f Auvergne e sp ec ia lly  spoke of d istingu ish ing  the powers by 
th e ir  operations, but h is d is tin c tio n  was only nominal, and fo r  him 
in  no way led to  a re a l p lu ra lity  of powers, Thomas agrees e n tire ly  
with W illiam’s p rin c ip le  th a t the  powers are  d istinguished  by th e ir  
operations and ob jec ts . How Thomas uses th is  p rin c ip le ; the meta­
physical basis  fo r  i t ;  i t s  complex re s u l ts ;  and how Thomas’ d is tin c ­
tion of the powers differs from William*s are the concern of th is  sec­
tio n ,
S t, Thomas says th a t a power in  so f a r  as i t  i s  a power i s
1spoken of only in  re la tio n  to  an a c t .  The powers then are defined by 
th e ir  a c ts  and are d istinguished  one from another according as th e i r  
a c ts  are d istingu ished . But th e ir  a c ts  are  d istingu ished  according to  
th e i r  ob jec ts , and so u ltim ate ly , the d is tin c tio n  of the powers of the 
soul i s  based on a d ifference of ob jec ts .
To explain th is ,  Thomas s ta r ts  by saying th a t "every operation
of the soul i s  the a c t of e ith e r  a passive or of an ac tiv e  power,"
The objects of the passive powers are  re la te d  to  these powers as the
1 g,_D. ^  Anima, a , 13, c , * Dicendum quod po ten tia  secundum id  
quod e s t ,  d ic i tu r  ad actum,
2 In De Anima, I I ,  l e c t ,  6, n, 305* Cmnis enim animae o p e ra tic , 
v e l e s t  actus po ten tiae , v e l passive.
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active  agents which reduce the powers to  a c tu a li ty . For example, 
v is ib le  objects ac tiv a te  the power of s ig h t, and, in  general, sense 
ob jects ac tiv a te  the sense powers. On the  other hand, the  objects 
of the ac tiv e  powers are re la te d  to  these powers as the ends of th e ir  
operations, because the object i s  what i s  rea lized  or achieved by the 
operation. For example, the object of the power of growth i s  p e rfec t 
quantity  and th is  i s  the end of growth.
By an a c tiv e  p rin c ip le  or power Thomas means some source of 
change in  some other th ing  inasmuch as i t  i s  o t h e r a n d  by a passive 
power he means a p rin c ip le  by which something i s  moved by something 
e lse  inasmuch as i t  i s  o ther.^  Since seme active  agent i s  required to  
bring about the change anything undergoes, Thomas says th a t  a passive 
power can always be reduced to  some f i r s t  active  power.
Thomas says th is  again when he comments on A r is to t le 's  method of 
defin ing  the p a r ts  of the so u l.^  A ris to tle , he says, s ta r ts  h is  con­
sid e ra tio n  of the p a rts  of the sou l, namely, in te l le c tu a l ,  se n s itiv e , 
and vegetative , from the a c t of the part in  question. This i s  because 
in  idea , a c ts  and operations are p rio r  to powers. "A p o te n tia l i ty  i s  
nothing but a capacity  to a c t or be acted upon; i t  e s se n tia lly  involves 
a re la tio n  to  a c tu a li ty  and can only be defined in  such terms.
3 In Metaph. , IX, le c t .  1, n. 1776; ...p rinc ip ium  quod d ic i tu r  
po ten tia  ac tiv a , e s t  principium transrautationis in  a l io  inquantum e s t 
a liu d .
4 Ib id . . n. 1777: . . . d i c i t u r  po ten tia  passive, quae e s t princ­
ipium quod a liq u id  moveatur ab a l io ,  inquantum e s t  a liu d .
5 In De Anima. I I ,  l e c t .  6, n. 3C4.
6 In  2 s  Anima. I I ,  l e c t .  6, n. 304: Potentia  enim, secundum hoc
ipsum quod e s t ,  im portât habitudinem quamdam ad actum: e s t  enim
principium quoddam agendi v e l pa tiend i: unde oportet quod actus pon- 
antur in  d e fin itio n ib u s  potentiarum.
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In  order to  prove th a t  a c t u a l i t y  i s  p r io r  t o  p o t e n t ia l i t y ,
Thomas uses three o f A r is to t le 's  proofs. He proves th a t a c t i s  p r io r  
to  p o te n t ia l i ty  in  i n t e l l i g ib i l i ty ,  in  tim e, and in  substance. Act i s  
p rio r in  i n t e l l i g ib i l i ty  because th a t  which i s  used to  define something 
e lse  i s  p rio r in  i n t e l l i g i b i l i ty  to  the th ing  defined. For example, the 
notion of animal must be understood before th a t of man; and again, the 
subject i s  p r io r  in  understanding to  i t s  acciden ts. Thomas explains 
th a t a p o te n tia lity  i s  definable only in  terms of an a c tu a li ty  because 
the f i r s t  c h a ra c te r is tic  of a p o te n tia lity  i s  the very p o s s ib il i ty  of 
i t  a c tu a lly  ac tin g  or ex is tin g . For example he says th a t a bu ilder i s  
defined as a man who i s  able to bu ild ; and a th e o r is t  i s  a man who i s  
able to  th eo rize ; and the v is ib le  i s  what i s  able to  be seen; e tc .
The d e fin itio n s  make sense only i f  bu ild ing , theo riz ing , and seeing 
a re  f i r s t  understood. And so the knowledge of a c tu a li ty  must be p rio r 
to  the knowledge of p o te n tia l i ty .?
But i f  p o te n tia lity  i s  defined only in  reference to  a c tu a li ty , 
how i s  a c tu a lity  defined? Thomas answers th a t i t  i s  not defined, but 
ra th e r i s  known only from induction. I t  i s  not defined because i t  i s ’ 
a simple notion (prima sim plic ia) which is  the s ta r tin g  poin t of know­
ledge. An ac t has to  be seen in  a proportion between two ex is tin g  
th ings. Some examples of A r is to t le 's  which Thomas uses are : ac t i s  re­
la ted  to  p o te n tia l i ty  as a man who i s  build ing i s  re la te d  to  a man who 
i s  capable of bu ild ing ; or as one who i s  awake i s  re la te d  to  one vdio i s  
asleep ; or as one who i s  seeing i s  re la ted  to  another w ith h is  eyes 
closed. An ac t and i t s  corresponding p o te n tia l ity  are  known then by
a
induction from p a rtic u la r  cases.
7 In Metaph. ,  IX, l e c t .  7, n . 1846.
8 In Metaph. . IX, l e c t .  5, nn. 1826-7.
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In  tim e, p o te n tia l ity  can be p rio r  to  a c tu a lity  in  one sense,
but a c tu a lity  i s  p r io r  to  p o te n t ia l i ty  in  a more ultim ate  sense.
P o te n tia li ty  i s  p rio r  to  a c tu a l i ty  in  the sense th a t before there
a c tu a lly  i s  a man, or ac tu a lly  i s  g ra in , there must e x is t m atter th a t
i s  p o ten tia lly  man, or seed th a t i s  p o te n tia lly  g ra in . But on the
other hand, p rio r  in  time to  the m atter th a t i s  p o te n tia lly  a man,
there  must e x is t other men who are the  active  agents who through the
ac t of generation w ill  bring the p o ten tia l man in to  a c tu a li ty . In
9
th is  way, a c t must be p rio r  to  p o te n tia lity .
Act i s  a lso p r io r  to  p o te n t ia l i ty  in  substance, and th is  Thomas 
in te rp re ts  as meaning "in  p e rfec tio n ."  He takes th is  in te rp re ta tio n  
because i t  i s  by i t s  form th a t a th in g  i s  perfected , and form i s  a lso  
sig n ified  by the term substance. P erfec tion  though has a double re fe r ­
ence: to  form, and to  the end of a th ing . With respect to  form, ac t i s  
p r io r  to  p o te n tia l i ty , but i s  subsequent in  the order of generation.
For example, in  generation a man comes from a boy, and a human being 
comes from seed; but man and human being have the perfection  of form 
which i s  lacking to  the boy and to  seed. And secondly everything th a t 
comes to  be moves towards some end which i s  a p rin c ip le  fo r  the a t ta in ­
ment of which, generation took place. Since a c tu a lity  i s  the goal of 
p o te n tia l ity  i t  i s  p r io r  to  and a p rin c ip le  of the p o te n t ia l i ty . I t  i s  
the goal of p o te n tia l i ty  because fo r  example, an animal does not see in  
order to have the power of s ig h t, but ra th e r  i t  has the power of s igh t 
in  order to  see. P o te n tia li ty  i s  fo r  ac t and not v ice versa.
9 In  Metaph. . IX, l e c t .  7, nn. 1847-8. 
10 ^  Metaph. , IX, le c t .  8, nn. 1856-7.
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Though p o te n tia l i ty  i s  fo r a c tu a lity  and can be reduced to  
a c tu a lity , nevertheless when they are found in  the same subject 
p o te n tia l ity  d if f e r s  from a c tu a li ty . Passive p o te n tia l ity  i s  the 
p rin c ip le  ex is tin g  in  a sub jec t, by which the subject i s  acted  upon 
by another th ing . For example, when a th in g  i s  burned i t  undergoes a 
change and the passive p o te n tia l i ty  i s  the p rin c ip le  present in  the 
burned th in g  by which i t  i s  capable of being burned. But in  co n tra s t, 
the ac tiv e  p o te n tia l i ty  i s  in  the subject or agent in  the  same way 
th a t heat i s  in  the th in g  which heats and the a r t  of bu ild ing  i s  in  
the  b u ilde r: i t  wants to  go out to  something else and change i t . ^ ^
"An ac t receives i t s  species then from i t s  p rin c ip le  or from 
12i t s  end." Thomas uses the d ifference  between heating and cooling 
to  i l l u s t r a te  th is .  The ac t o f heating s t a r t s  from the p rin c ip le  of 
heat to  warm something, while the action  of cooling s ta r ts  from the 
p rincip le  of cold to  cool something. Since heat and coolness are  
sp e c if ic a lly  d if fe re n t p rin c ip le s  they d istingu ish  th e i r  respective  
a c ts . Also the ends of the  ac tions of heating and cooling a re  d i f f ­
e ren t, namely, to  produce something warm or cold. These ends are  
sp e c if ic a lly  d if fe re n t and so then are the actions which re s u l t  in  
them.
Both the active  and the  passive powers then are  d iv e rs if ie d  by 
th e ir  a c ts  and ob jec ts . T his, Thomas says, i s  because whatever has 
esse fo r  some end, has i t s  mode of esse determined from th a t  end to  
which i t  i s  ordained. For example, in  order to  be su itab le  fo r  i t s
11 In Metaph. . IX, l e c t .  1, n. 1782.
12 Sum. Theol. I , q .  77, a . 3, c .s  Ex h is  autem duobus a c tio  
speciem r e c ip i t ,  s c i l ic e t  ex p rin c ip io , v e l ex fin e  seu term ine.
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end as a cu ttin g  instrum ent, a saw has to  have a ce rta in  form and 
c e rta in  m atter. As Thomas explained above, every p o te n tia l i ty  whether 
ac tive  or passive, i s  ordained to  some ac t as to  i t s  end. And every 
p o te n tia lity  has to  be a p o te n tia l i ty  to  scmething in  some d e f in ite  
way and condition. For instance there  must be a p o te n tia l i ty  to  walk­
ing or s i t t in g  before a person can walk or s i t ,  and the time of season 
must be r ig h t  before a tre e  w il l  bear f r u i t .  Every power then has a 
d e f in ite  mode and species according to  which i t  i s  su itab le  to  such and
such an a c t .  The powers therefo re  are  d iv e rs if ied  because the d iv e rs ity
13of ac ts  requ ires d if fe re n t p rin c ip le s  from which to  e l i c i t  the a c ts .
Thomas a lso  regards the d iv e rs ity  of objects in  a twofold manner. 
Objects can d i f f e r  according to  th e i r  natures a s , fo r  in stance , ta s te  
d if fe r s  from colour; or they can d if f e r  according to  th e i r  diverse in ­
t e l l ig ib le  charac ter, a s , fo r  in stance , the good d if fe r s  from the 
true.^^
A note of caution i s  added when Thomas poin ts out th a t  a species 
i s  not divided by th ings acciden ta l to  i t  but ra th e r  by what p e rta in s  
to  i t s  very natu re . The species of an animal fo r instance, i s  not 
changed by a change in  i t s  colour, which i s  acc iden ta l to  i t .  But a 
d ifference which a ffec ted  the very nature of an animal, fo r  example, 
the d ifference  in  the sen sitiv e  soul between ra tio n a l and i r r a t io n a l ,  
would change the species of the  genus of animal. S im ilarly , Thomas 
says, not ju s t  any v a rie ty  of objects w ill  d iv e rs ify  the powers of the
13 De V e r i t . , q. 15, a . 2, c . j  In  u trisque p o te n tiis  [a c tiv a  and 
p a s s iv ^  inveniuntur actus e t obiecta non solum esse signa d iv e r s i ta t i s  
sed causae aliquo modo.
14 I b id . ; Sed obiectorum d iv e rs ita s  d u p lic ite r  a tten d i p o ste s t: 
uno modo secundum naturam rerum; a l io  modo secundum rationem.
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sotil, but only a d ifference in  th a t  to  which the power of i t s  very 
nature i s  d irec ted . The ob jects in  so f a r  as they are o b jec ts , are  
divided in to  colour, sound, e tc . ,  and so the powers of sense are div­
ided accordingly in to  sigh t fo r  colour, hearing fo r  sound, and so on. 
However i f  the objects d i f f e r  only acc iden ta lly , th a t  i s ,  i f  they do 
not d if f e r  in  so fa r  as they are  ob jec ts then they w ill  not cause any 
d iv e rs ity  in  the sense powers of the soul. For example i t  i s  an 
acc iden ta l d ifference to  an object as ob jec t, say, something coloured,
fo r i t  to  be a grammarian or a m usician, great or sm all, a man or a 
15swOno #
Having estab lished  th a t  the powers are  d istinguished  by th e i r  
operations, and the  operations in  tu rn  by th e ir  ob jec ts , Thomas then 
se ts  about to  see how the p rin c ip le  app lies to  man, th a t i s ,  he d is­
tingu ishes the many powers in  man, Thomas s ta r ts  by examining the 
various grades in  the ac tions of the soul according as the action  of 
the soul transcends the actions of a nature operating in  an inanimate 
th ing . This transcendance, he says, occurs both with respect to  the 
manner of acting  and with respect to  what i s  produced by the ac tion .
In i t s  manner of ac tin g , the soul which i s  the p rin c ip le  of l i f e  and 
the source of self-movement in  a th ing , i s  the  in tr in s ic  agent of 
operation and as such transcends the operation of the inanimate natu re . 
But w ith respect to  the e ffe c t produced, the action  of the soul may or 
may not transcend the  action  of the  inanimate soul, because the e ffe c t 
produced and the th ings necessary fo r the e ffe c t , requ ire  the same
15 Sum, Theol, I ,  q, 77, a , 3, c . :  Sed tamen considerandum es t 
quod ea quae sunt per accidens, non d iv e rs if ic a n t speciem.
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action  from e ith e r  an animate or inanimate body. The d ifference  i s  
th a t  the e f fe c t  of an inanimate body i s  brought about by an e x tr in s ic  
agent while the animate body has an in tr in s ic  p rin c ip le  of ac tio n .
Thomas says th a t i t  i s  to  th is  so rt of ac tion  th a t  the powers
of the vegetative  soul are  d irec te d . The generative power i s  ordained
to  giving esse to  an ind iv idual liv in g  th ing , while the augmentative 
power enables a l iv in g  body to  acquire i t s  proper s ize , and the nut­
r i t iv e  power preserves the liv in g  body in  esse . An inanimate nature
17could produce such e ffe c ts  only by the a id  of some e x tr in s ic  agent.
Because the  soul i s  n a tu ra lly  disposed to  receive a l l  th ings in
i t s e l f  im m aterially through sense and in te l le c t ,  Thomas continues on 
to  say th a t i t  has other ac tions which transcend both the actions of 
na tu ra l vegetative  forms and th e ir  e f fe c ts .  Through the senses, by 
means of bodily  organs, the ind iv idual species of corporeal th ings are 
received in to  the soul without th e i r  proper m atter. And through the 
in te l le c t  the soul, w ithout the aid  of bodily  organs, receives species 
which are completely abstrac ted  from m atter and the indiv iduating  
m ateria l conditions. So the in te l le c t  i s  a higher, more p e rfec t grade 
of in m a te ria lity  than i s  the sense. Following the apprehension of 
e ith e r  a sensible or in te l l ig ib le  form, i s  a na tu ra l in c lin a tio n  to ­
wards the apprehended th ing , a ris in g  from the ap p etitiv e  power of the 
soul. By i t s  motive power the soul i s  re fe rred  to  something e x tr in s ic  
as to  the end of i t s  operation and movement: i t  enables the  soul to
16 D. ^  Anima, a, 13, c, : Oportet autem in  action ibus animae 
tr e s  gradus considerare; See a lso  Sum. Theol. I ,  q , 78, a . 1 , c,
17 2* ÉÊ Anima. a , 13, c , : Et huiusmodi sunt actiones , , , ,
See a lso  Sum, Theol, I ,  q, 78, a , 2, c .
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T_ftre a liz e  i t s  desires  and in te n tio n s .
For the sense knowledge of a perfect animal, Thomas says th a t 
five  th in g s are necessary. F ir s t  i s  the proper sense by which the 
animal receives species from sensible th in g s , and by which the animal 
d iscerns the proper sensible from other th ings coming in  under the 
same sense, fo r  example, i t  d iscerns white from black, or any o ther 
colour. And to  make a d iscerning judgnent about the sensib le  species 
received th a t i s  not possible to  the proper sense, there  i s  required 
the  common sense. For instance i t  d istingu ishes white from sweet. To 
do th i s ,  the common sense must know both white and sweet: more broadly, 
i t  must receive and know the species of a l l  the senses, as being th e i r  
root and p rin c ip le . And a f te r  a species has been received, a perfect 
animal must re ta in  and preserve i t ,  otherwise i t  would never be moved to  
seek something absent. This re te n tio n  belongs to  the im agination.
The fourth  requirement fo r  the  l i f e  of a p e rfec t animal i s  the 
estim ative power by which the animal grasps in ten tio n s  not received 
through th e  proper senses, fo r example, th a t something i s  harmful or 
u se fu l. Animals perceive these in ten tio n s 6y n a tu ra l in s t in c t :  the 
sheep n a tu ra lly  f le e s  the wolf, not because the wolf i s  of such a shape 
or colour. And b ird s n a tu ra lly  bu ild  nests  fo r use, not fo r the  p lea­
sure of build ing . But man i s  able to  grasp these in ten tio n s  by in ­
quiry and in ference , and so th is  power in  him i s  called  the cog ita tive  
power or p a rtic u la r  reason. The f i f th  requirement i s  memory. By the 
memory animals r e c a l l  to  ac tual consideration th ings apprehended by the 
sense and conserved in te r io r ly ,  and a lso  the in ten tio n s  known by the
18 D. ^  Anima, a , 13, c , : Sunt autem a lia e  a l t io re s  
a c t io n e s , . , .  See a lso  Sum, Theol, I ,  q , 78, a , 1 , c.
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estim ative power. Animals have sudden rec o lle c tio n  of the past only, 
but men are able to  seek past in ten tio n s by lo g ic a l reasoning. Thomas 
says th a t  a separate power i s  needed fo r memory because i t s  a c t iv i ty  
moves from the soul to  th in g s , while i t  i s  the reverse w ith  the other 
sen tien t powers which move from th in g s  to  the souls and diverse move­
ments require  d iverse motive p rin c ip le s  or powers.
The proper sense, which i s  changed immediately by sensib le  ob­
je c ts  i s  necessarily  divided according to  what belongs to  th e  senses 
properly and per se . Since they a re  passive powers, the senses are 
n a tu ra lly  changed by the e x te r io r  sensib le  which per se i s  perceived.
I t  i s  according to  the  d iv e rs ity  of e x te r io r  causes then th a t the proper 
sense i s  d iv e rs if ie d . Because in  sensing the sensible species i s  re ­
ceived without m atter, Thomas se ts  up an order among the m odifications 
which a l t e r  the senses according as they are  more or le s s  s p i r i tu a l .
Some sensible ob jec ts , though th e ir  species are received im m aterially 
by the sense, cause a m ateria l change in  the sensing animal, e ith e r  
by heating or cooling, or w etting or drying, e tc . These q u a li t ie s  
which change the animal are known only by contact and so the sense 
power which experiences them i s  ca lled  touch. Other sensible q u a li t ie s , 
those known by ta s te ,  both bring about a change in  the  sense organ and 
in  themselves a lso , espec ia lly  by m oisture. Where the sense immutation 
involves change only on the p a rt of the  sensed ob jec t, contact i s  not 
necessary but ra th e r  a medium i s  used fo r  sensing. This occurs in  
sm elling, which i s  caused by d iss ip a tio n  and a lte ra t io n  of the sensible 
ob jec t; and in  hearing, which i s  caused by percussion and commotion of
19 â» D. de Anima, a , 13, c , ; Ad perfectam autem sensus cognit- 
ionem , , , .  See a lso  Sum, Theol. I ,  q, 78, a . 4 , c .
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the a i r .  The q u a li t ie s  o f colour and l ig h t  apprehended by s ig h t,
modify the sense w ith no m ateria l change on the part of e ith e r  the
sense or the sense ob ject. Sight therefo re  i s  the most s p ir i tu a l  and
noble of a l l  the five  ex ternal senses, and extends to  more objects than 
20the o thers.
The ap p e titiv e  power i s  divided in to  the concupiscible and the
ira s c ib le . The concupiscible power i s  th a t by which the soul seeks
what i s  su itab le  to  i t  according to  the senses and f le e s  what i s  harm- •
fu l to  i t ;  while the ira sc ib le  power r e s is ts  whatever i s  contrary  to
the in c lin a tio n s  of the concupiscible power and makes possib le  the
21enjoyment of the thing desired  by i t .
The motive power which makes possible the lo ca l motions of the
animal i s  d iv e rs if ie d  with respect to  these lo ca l motions. For instance
in  d iffe re n t animals there  are  d if fe re n t powers enabling seme to  walk,
sane to  crawl, some to  f ly ,  e tc .  Also there  would be d if fe re n t motive
powers in  d if fe re n t p a rts  of the body according to  the loca l movement
00of the various p a rts  and limbs.
The powers of the soul which use no physical organ extend in  
th e ir  action  to  a l l  beings. Hence the diverse natures of th e i r  objects 
cannot d is tin g u ish  them, since they extend to  them a l l .  The powers of 
the  in te l le c t  then  can be d istinguished only in  so f a r  as the ac t of 
the soul i s  d irec ted  to  one and the same th in g  according to  d iffe re n t 
re la tio n s  a t d iffe re n t tim es. That i s ,  the in te l le c t  i s  divided in to
20 2* 2" de Anima, a , 13, c , : Quia vero sensus proprius 
See a lso  Sum, Theol, I ,  q, 78, a , 3, c,
21 D, de Anima, a , 13, c . : S im ilite r  autem v is  a p p e tit iv a . , , ,
22 Q, D, de Anima, a , 13, c , : Vis autem m o tiv a ,,,.
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the understanding, according as the  soul i s  d irec ted  to  in te l l ig ib le  
tru th  as to  a form; and the w i l l ,  according as the soul i s  d irec ted  
to  the good as to  i t s  end,
Thomas a lso  d ivides the power of understanding in to  the agent 
and possib le  in te l le c t ,  fo r  the reason th a t an object i s  not an object 
fo r  the  same reason when i t  i s  in  ac t and when i t  i s  in  potency, A 
th ing  ac tu a lly  in te l l ig ib le  i s  the object of the possib le  in te l le c t  
and i t  reduces the possib le  in te l l e c t  from p o te n tia l ity  to  a c t ;  while 
a th ing  p o te n tia lly  in te l l ig ib le  i s  the object of the agent in te l le c t ,  
which makes the object to  be ac tu a lly  i n t e l l i g i b l e , ^
So from the th ree  grades of ac tion  of the sou l, namely the 
vegetative , the se n s itiv e , and the in te l le c tu a l ,  Thomas shows th a t 
there are  fiv e  genera of powers of the soul d istingu ished  by th e ir  
a c ts  and ob jec ts , namely, the  vegetative , the se n s itiv e , the  in te l le c t ­
iv e , the a p p e titiv e , and the  locomotive, each of which contains many 
powers under i t s e l f .
The p resen ta tion  of Thomas’ doctrine concerning the d is tin c tio n  
of the powers does not in d ica te  how rad ic a lly  i t  d if fe rs  from William 
of Auvergne’s po sitio n . Rather i t  merely shows Thomas carrying out 
the same p rin c ip le  as William, namely, th a t the operations d is tin g u ish  
the powers. The d ifference  can be seen only in  the l ig h t  of what has 
already been developed in  t h i s  th e s is , Thomas crushed W illiam’s not­
ion th a t the essence of the soul i s  the immediate p rin c ip le  of i t s  
operations. Hence W illiam’s view th a t the d iffe re n t ’’powers” only 
ind icate  d iffe re n t operations of the whole soul i s  m eaningless: the
23 De V e rit. . q, 15, a . 2, c , :  I l i a  vero pars animae quae n o n ,,,,
24 De V e rit. . q, 15, a , 2, c , : Sic etiam c irca  in te lle c tu m .. . ,
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whole soul does not ac t immediately. The powers then are  something 
d is t in c t  from the essence of the soul. Thomas ëiowed th a t the powers 
of the soul were accidents of the soul having onto logical r e a l i ty .
What a d ifference these two poin ts make. When Thomas uses operation 
as a p rin c ip le  of d is tin c tio n  he i s  applying i t  to  powers th a t have 
rea l existence d is t in c t  from the essence of the soul. To d is tin g u ish  
th ings th a t have rea l existence re s u lts  in  a rea l p lu ra lity :  each power 
i s  a d iffe re n t accidental form of the soul. And th is  i s  the rad ica l 
d ifference  between Thomas' view of d istingu ish ing  the powers, and W ill­
iam' s: Thomas has a re a l p lu ra lity  of powers, while William has only 
a nominal d is t in c t io n  of the operations of the essence of the soul.
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VI THE DISTINCTION OF ESSENCE AND ESSE IN CREATURES
There remains now the necessity  fo r a section  explaining a t 
g rea te r length  the metaphysical foundations of Thomas' notions of the 
powers of the soul. Many of Thomas' arguments in  h is  c ritic ism  of 
the position  upholding the id e n ti ty  of the soul and i t s  powers were 
d ire c tly  based on the d is tin c tio n  of essence and esse in  man. The 
basis fo r  th is  d is tin c tio n  w ill  be the main aim of th is  section .
Also to  be estab lished  i s  how s p ir i tu a l  substances w ith lim ited  esse 
are  in  potency to  ipsum e sse . F in a lly  how esse i s  the ac t of every 
substance; and the re la tio n sh ip  between form and esse w il l  be explored.
In many of h is  major works lik e  the Summa Theologiae and the Sum- 
ma Contra G en tiles. S t. Thomas' order of p resen tation  i s  th eo lo g ica l, 
s ta r tin g  frcm considerations about god, then working down through the 
angels to  man. The d is tin c tio n  of essence and esse in  man has already 
been applied to  show th a t in  him power i s  d if fe re n t frcm essence. By 
examining th is  same d is tin c tio n  which Thomas m aintains in  the angels, 
and by examining h is  id e n tif ic a tio n  of essence and esse in  God, the 
basis fo r  the use of the d is tin c tio n  in  man w ill  be found. F in a lly  
Thomas' arguments d istingu ish ing  essence and esse in  man, based 
sp e c if ic a lly  on the nature of created in te l le c tu a l  substances w il l  be 
presented and examined.
Thomas shows how the powers and essence are d istingu ished  in  an 
angel by the fa c t  th a t in  no creature  i s  the essence the same as i t s  
e sse , but ra th e r i s  compared to  i t  as potency i s  to  a c t .  The ac t
73
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of an operative power i s  i t s  operation. But since in  an angel n e ith e r 
the a c t of understanding nor any o ther operation i s  the same as i t s  
e sse , ne ither than i s  an a n g e l 's  power of understanding, or any o ther 
power, the  same as i t s  essence.^
The argument ju s t  given depends on the d is tin c tio n  of esse and 
operations, or f i r s t  ac t and second ac t in  a l l  c rea tu res. This d is tin c ­
tio n  was a lso  the  c ru c ia l point in  many of Thomas' arguments proving 
the d is tin c tio n  of the powers of the soul from i t s  essence. To prove 
th a t esse and operation are  d is t in c t  in  angels and in  every other c re a t­
u re , Thomas investiga ted  the twofold c lass of ac tion , tra n s ie n t and im­
manent, fo r the basis of h is  argument. In  tra n s ie n t  ac tio n , ac tion  goes 
out frcm seme agent to  something beyond, causing passion in  th a t th in g , 
a s , fo r  example, burning and cu ttin g . This kind of action  cannot be 
the esse of the  agent because the esse of a th ing  i s  w ith in  th a t  th ing  
i t s e l f ,  w hile tra n s ie n t ac tion  denotes an outflowing frcm the agent.
But the  second c lass  of ac tio n , immanent ac tion , takes place wholly 
w ith in  the agent, a s , fo r  example, to  sense, to  understand, to  w il l .
By i t s  very nature immanent ac tion  i s  ordained to  in f in i ty  e ith e r  
absolu tely  or r e la tiv e ly . Thomas explains th is  statement w ith several 
examples. The ac ts  of understanding and w illin g , whose ob jec ts are 
respec tive ly  the tru e  and the good, are  ordered to  in f in i ty  abso lu te ly . 
This i s  because the good and the tru e  are  convertib le with being ( cum 
e n t e ) and so to  understand and to  w ill  are re la te d  in  themselves to
1 Sum. Theol. I ,  q. 54, a . 3, c .
2 Concerning the good see: Sum. Theol. I ,  q. 5, a . 1, c . : Dicend- 
um quod bonum e t ens sunt idem secundum rem. Concerning the tru e  see: 
Ib id . . q. 16, a . 3, c . : . . . s i c u t  bonum convertitu r cum en te , i t a  e t 
verum. •
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
75
a l l  th in g s , and are specified  th e i r  ob jects. Thomas' example of 
re la tiv e  in f in i ty  i s  the act of sensation which i s  re la te d  to  a l l  
sensible th in g s . While the esse of every creature i s  r e s t r ic te d  to  
one in  genus and species, the esse of God i s  abso lu tely  in f in i te ,  com­
prehending a l l  th ings w ith in  i t s e l f ,  and so the esse of God alone i s
3
i t s  own ac t of understanding and i t s  own ac t of w i l l .  Thomas con­
cludes h is  argument here but i t  may be seen th a t the ac t o f sensation  
and a l l  other ac ts  pe rta in ing  to  re la tiv e  in f in i ty  are d is t in c t  frcm 
th e i r  esse by the same argument. That i s ,  esse i s  r e s t r ic te d  to  one 
in  genus and species, while sense a c ts  p e rta in  to  more than one genus 
and species.
N either i s  the action  of an angel id en tica l with i t s  substance, 
because an a c tio n  i s  the a c tu a lity  of a power in  the  same way th a t esse 
i s  the a c tu a l i ty  of a substance or essence. But since a c tu a li ty  i s  
opposed to  p o te n tia l ity , nothing which has some mixture of p o te n tia l­
i t y  can be i t s  own a c t. Because God alone i s  pure a c t, Thcmas con­
cludes th a t only in  God i s  His substance the same as His esse and 
His ac tio n .^
Thomas continues on to  say a lso  th a t i f  an an g e l's  ac t of 
understanding were h is  substance, i t  would have to  be subsis ting .
Since a subsis ten t a c t of understanding could be one only, ju s t as 
subsis ten t whiteness could only be one, i t  would be impossible to  
d istingu ish  the substance of the angel from the substance of God, or 
frcm any other angel, which idea Thomas re je c ts .^
3 Sum. Theol. I ,  q. 54, a . 2, c.
4 Ib id . . a . 1, c . : Dicendum quod im p o ssib ile .. . .
5 Ib id . . P raeterea  s i  in te l l ig e re  a n g e l i . . . .
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Both in  h is  treatm ent of man and of the angels Thomas has 
in s is te d  on the d is tin c tio n  of th e ir  essence from th e i r  e s se ; and he 
has compared the  essence to  the esse as potency to  a c tu a li ty . To see 
then what the  basis i s  fo r  the d is t in c tio n  as Thomas has presented i t ,  
the essence and e sse of God w ill  be considered next.
God i s  in f in i te  a c t, possessing the en tire  fu lln e ss  of being 
(essendi), not contracted to  any nature of genus or species. God's 
ipsum esse then i s  not an esse put in to  seme nature which i s  not i t s  
own esse , because then i t  would be lim ited  to  th a t na ture . So God i s  
said to  be ipsum suum esse . But, Thomas adds, th is  cannot be said 
of any of God's c rea tu res , because in  the same way th a t whiteness 
apart from every subject and re c ip ie n t, i f  th is  were possib le , would 
be one only, so ipsum esse subsistens could be one only. And so 
Thcmas goes on to  say th a t every th ing  which comes a f te r  the f i r s t  
being (ens) . because i t  i s  not i t s  own e sse , has esse received in  
something through which ipsum esse i s  contracted: in  every created 
th ing , the nature of the th ing  which p a rtic ip a te s  esse i s  one th ing , 
and the p a rtic ip a te d  ipsum esse i s  another. Everything p a rtic ip a te s  
the f i r s t  ac t by being made s im ila r to  i t  in  so f a r  as the th ing  has 
esse . The p a rtic ip a ted  esse i s  re la ted  then to  the p a rtic ip a tin g  
nature as ac t i s  re la te d  to  potency.
This argument i s  very important in  i t s  scope. I t  s ta r ts  o ff 
by saying the in fin ite n e ss  of God's a c tu a lity  precludes i t s  being 
lim ited  to  any genus or species, meaning th a t in  Him His essence i s
6 De S p ir . G reat. . a . 1, c . : Manifestum e s t  enira quod primum 
ens, quod Deus e s t ,  e s t actus i n f in i t u s . . . .
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His e sse . Then i t  continues on to  show th a t subsis ten t esse can be 
one only and th a t  in  every creatu re  e sse , which i s  one th in g , i s  
received in to  some lim ited  na tu re , which i s  another; and the re la tio n  
of th is  nature to  the received esse i s  a re la tio n  of potency to  a c t .
The re s t  of th is  section  w il l  only go to  fu rth e r explain and re ­
inforce the ideas brought out here; th a t in  God, His essence i s  His 
e sse ; th a t in  c reatu res essence i s  d is t in c t  from e sse ; and th a t  ess­
ence i s  re la te d  to  esse as potency to  a c t.
Thcmas o ffe rs  an argument fo r the id e n ti ty  of esse and essence 
in  God which s t a r t s  from th ings wherein they are d is t in c t .  In  c rea tu res 
whose essence d if fe rs  from th e i r  esse, what i t  i s  (quod s i t ) i s  d is ­
t in c t  frcm th a t  whereby i t  i s  (quo s i t ) , because we say th a t something 
i s  by i t s  esse and say what i t  i s  by i t s  essence. In  th is  way a def­
in it io n  sign ify ing  an essence t e l l s  what a th in g  i s .  But, Thomas 
concludes, God i s  a simple th in g , having no composition and so there  
i s  no d is tin c tio n  between what He i s  and th a t whereby He i s  and so His 
essence i s  not d is t in c t  from His e sse .?
Thomas argues in  the same place th a t because God i s  pure act 
with no mixture of potency His essence must be the ultim ate a c t w ithin 
Him. Any ac t re la te d  to  the u ltim ate ac t i s  in  potency to  th a t  u l­
tim ate a c t ,  which i s  ipsum e sse , according to  Thomas. In c rea tu res , 
since a l l  motion i s  a passing from potency to  a c tu a li ty , u ltim ate 
a c tu a lity  i s  what a l l  motion tends to , and since tendency i s  fo r what 
i s  n a tu ra lly  desired , th is  u ltim ate  ac t must be desired  by a l l .  And
7 Compendium Theologiae, I ,  c. 11. (See Bibliography, Thcmas 
Aquinas, S a in t, 2 .)  [H ereafter abbreviated Compend. Theo]^
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th is  Thomas says i s  esse . The divine essence then , which i s  pure and
g
ultim ate a c t ,  i s  ipsum esse.
"The f i r s t  e ffe c t God works in  th ings i s  ipsum esse on which 
a l l  other e ffe c ts  are  b a s e d . G o d  i s  existence i t s e l f :  existence 
belongs to  Him in  v irtu e  of His essence, but belongs to  a l l  o ther 
th ings by p a rtic ip a tio n  because the essence of no creature  i s  i t s  
ex istence. This i s  because esse which i s  per se subsis ten t can be 
one only, and th is  i s  God, Who th ere fo re  i s  the cause of existence 
in  a l l  th ings th a t e x is t .
Thomas a lso  argues th a t whatever i s  outside of the essence of 
a th in g  i s  caused e ith e r  by the constituen t p rin c ip les  of th a t essence 
or by some e x te r io r  agent. So i f  ipsum esse of a th ing  d if fe r s  from 
i t s  essence, i t  must come to  th e  essence in  e ith e r  of these two ways. 
But i f  the  esse of a th ing  i s  caused, i t  cannot be caused by the con­
s ti tu e n t p rin c ip le s  of the essence because then i t  would be the cause 
of i t s e l f .  So the esse must be caused by some other being i f  i t  
d if fe rs  from i t s  essence. Since God i s  the f i r s t  cause though. His 
esse cannot d if f e r  from His essence.
Thomas says th a t esse denominates an a c t ,  because a th in g  i s  
said to  have esse in so fa r as i t  i s  in  a c t, not because i t  i s  in  po­
tency. Everything which has an ac t belonging to  i t  th a t i s  d iffe re n t 
from the th ing  i t s e l f ,  i s  re la te d  to  th a t ac t as potency i s  re la ted
8 Compend. Theol. I ,  c . 11, Ostensum e s t quod Deus e s t  actus 
purus. .  .1
9 Compend. Theol. c. 68: Primus autem effec tue  Dei in  rebus e s t 
ipsum esse , quod cmnes a l i i  e ffec tu s praesupponunt, e t  supra quod 
fundantur . . . .  Ostensum e s t  autem supra quod Deus e s t  ipsum suum esse.
10 Sum. Theol. I ,  q. 3, a . 4, c . : Primo quidem quia quidquid e s t .
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to  a c t. I f  in  God the divine essence d if fe r s  from i t s  e sse , then 
essence and esse must be re la te d  as potency to  a c t .  God however i s  
pure a c t ,  w ith no admixture of potency, and hence, the divine essence 
i s  not d iffe re n t from the  divine e sse .^^
Another argument th a t  Thomas uses builds on the fa c t  th a t some 
esse i s  esse necessarily  and per se , and th a t th is  i s  God. I f  th is  
esse which i s  necessary belongs to  an essence which i s  not what i t  i s ,  
e ith e r  i t  i s  incompatible w ith, or repugnant to  th a t essence: a s , fo r 
example, i t  i s  repugnant to  the essence of whiteness to  e x is t  per se ; 
or, i t  i s  compatible w ith or appropriate to  i t ,  a s , fo r example, fo r 
whiteness to  be in  some sub ject. In  the  f i r s t  a lte rn a tiv e , the esse 
which i s  per se necessary w ill  not b e f i t  th a t essence, ju s t  as i t  
does not b e f i t  whiteness to  e x is t per se . But i f  the e sse , per se 
necessary, i s  compatible with the essence, then three more a lte rn a ­
tiv e s  present themselves: the esse could depend on the essence, or 
both the esse and the essence could depend on another cause, or 
f in a l ly  the essence could depend on the e sse . Thomas re je c ts  the 
f i r s t  two as being contrary to  th e  nature of what i s  esse per se 
necessary, because nothing which depends on something e lse  can be 
a necessary esse . In  the th ird  a lte rn a tiv e  the essence th a t depends 
on the esse i s  added to  th a t esse acc iden ta lly , because whatever f o l l ­
ows on a thing* s esse i s  acc iden ta l to  th a t th ing , and so i s  not i t s
essence. But God i s  His essence, and so therefo re  does not have an
12essence th a t  i s  not His esse .
11 Cont. Gent. I ,  c. 22: Esse actum quendam naninat: non enim 
d ic i tu r  esse a liq u id  ex hoc quod e s t in  po ten tia , sed ex eo quod e s t 
in  a c tu . . . .
12 Cont. Gent. I ,  c. 22: Ostensum es t enim s u p r a . . . .
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These arguments of Thomas' su ffice  to  show th a t in  God His 
essence i s  His e sse , and they a lso  su ffice  to  show th a t th is  id e n tity  
i s  possib le  only in  God, and th a t  in  a l l  c reatu res the essence and 
esse are  d is t in c t .  Now the argument w ill  s h if t  from God down to  
created in te llig e n c e s . The composition of foim and esse in  these 
w ill  be examined, leading to  arguments sp e c if ic a lly  dealing  with the 
d is tin c tio n  of essence frcm esse in  created in te l le c tu a l  substances.
In the human soul, or other created in te llig e n c e , there  i s  no 
composition of m atter and form, but there  i s  in  i t  a composition of 
form and esse. The d ifference between the essence of a composite sub­
stance and th a t of a simple substance, according to  Thcmas, i s  th a t 
the essence of the composite substance enccmpasses both form and 
m atter, while the essence of the simple substance i s  i t s  form alone. 
From th is  i t  follows th a t th e  essence of a composite substance can be 
s ig n ified  as a whole or as a p a rt according to  the  designation of 
m atter. Therefore the essence of a composite th in g  i s  not predicated  
of the composite thing i t s e l f ,  because, fo r  example, man i s  not said 
to  be h is  essence. But the essence of a simple substance which i s  the 
form of the substance i s  s ig n if ie d  only as the whole, because th e re  i s  
nothing outside of the form as receptive of the foim. In  whatever way
then th a t the essence of a simple substance be taken, i t  i s  predicated
13of the substance.
But Thomas does not say th a t a simple substance i s  simple ab­
so lu te ly , in so fa r as th is  would make i t  pure a c t. There remains seme
13 De Ente e t E ssen tia , c. 4 , (j). 33, l in e  33 -  p. 36, l in e  ^  
(See Bibliography, Thcmas Aquinas, s 5 n t ,  4 ): In  hoc ergo d i f f e r t  
e ssen tia  substan tie  composite . . . .
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potency in  i t ,  which i s  c lea r from what follow s: those th ings which 
do not belong to  the  idea of essence are added to  i t  from outside 
and make a composite with the essence, because the essence cannot be 
understood without those th ings which a re  the p a rts  of essence. But 
an essence can be understood without anything being known of i t s  e sse , 
fo r example, the  essence.of a man or a phoenix can be understood 
without anything being known of i t s  e sse . Esse i s  d if fe re n t from 
the essence then unless they belong to  a th in g  in  which the essence
i s  i t s  very esse . In th is  case the th ing  i s  one and i t  i s  f i r s t .
Since i t  i s  esse subsis tens, th is  esse could not take on any d ifference  
because then i t  would become esse plus seme form, and no longer be esse 
only; and i t  could not take on m atter because then i t  would no longer 
be su b sis tin g , but m ateria l. So th a t  which is  i t s  own esse can be one 
only. In  anything outside of th is  then, esse i s  one th ing  and essence 
i s  another. In  ah in te llig en c e  then, above the form i s  the e sse , and
so there  i s  the composition of form and esse .^^
The reasoning behind Thomas' statement th a t  the essence of a 
man or phoenix could be known without anything being known of i t s  esse 
i s  ra th e r  questionable. The statement i s  open to  the  charge of th ink­
ing with the  im agination. However lo g ic a lly  sound the statement i s ,  
a phoenix ju s t could not be known and fu lly  understood unless i t  ex­
is te d  to  be examined. Statement a f te r  statement could be said  about 
phoenixes, but unless phoenixes ex isted , to  ta lk  about th e ir  essence 
would be to  ta lk  about nothing, or a t  most, about a figment of the 
im agination.
14 De Ente e t  E ssen tia , c . 4.
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An in te llig e n c e  then i s  form and esse* and i t  receives i t s  
esse from the f i r s t  ente which i s  esse only. However, anything which 
receives something frcm another i s  in  potency to  th a t th ing , in  re s ­
pect of th a t which i t  rece ives, and what i s  received i s  i t s  a c t .  So 
the essence of an in te llig en ce  must be in  potency in  respect to  the 
esse i t  receives frcm God, and th a t esse i s  received a f te r  the manner 
of an a c t. Potency and ac t are therefo re  found in  in te llig e n c e s , and 
th e ir  composition i s  spoken of as being of th a t by which i t  i s  and 
th a t which i t  i s ,  o r, of th a t  which i t  i s  and e sse .^^
Here Thomas has shown how an in te l le c tu a l  substance i s  in  po­
tency. The potency i s  with respect to  the ipsum esse . Everything 
which a c ts  has i t s  esse from God Who i s  f i r s t  a c t ,  and so i t  i s  in  
potency to  th is  f i r s t  a c t. This potency w ill  be explained s t i l l  
fu rth e r below.
I t  now remains to  show the sp ec ific  arguments by which Thomas 
shows th a t in  created in te l le c tu a l  substances esse d if fe r s  froa  quod 
e s t . Here, as has been seen above, Thomas argues by opposing esse 
subsistens to  c rea tu res to  show th a t  esse subsistens can be one only. 
In the f i r s t  argument Thomas s ta te s  th a t nothing besides ipsum esse 
can be added to  esse subsis ten s. He explains th is  w ith the p a ra lle l  
s itu a tio n  in  non-subsistent e sse . Everything in  an ex is tin g  th ing  
besides i t s  esse i s  united  to  the th in g , but i s  one w ith the esse 
only acc id en ta lly , th a t i s ,  in so far as the th ing  i s  one subject hav­
ing esse and th a t which i s  other than esse . For example, in  Socrates 
there  i s  w hite, which i s  o ther than h is  esse su b s ta n tie ls , the white
15 De Ente e t E ssen tia , c . 4.
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i s  un ited  to  the  esse substan tia le  only acc iden ta lly . So i f  esse 
i s  not in  some subject there  i s  no way in  which what i s  other than 
esse can be united  to  th a t e sse . Which proves the f i r s t  statem ent 
of the argument. Thomas goes on then to  say th a t  esse cannot be div­
erse in so fa r as i t  i s  e sse , but th a t  esse can be d iv e rs if ie d  by some­
th ing  other than i t s e l f ,  in  the way th a t the esse of a stone i s  d i f f ­
e ren t from the esse of a man. Esse subsistens therefo re  can be one 
only, and th i s  i s  God. Nothing besides God can be h is  own e sse , and 
so then in  eveiy substance outside of God the substance i t s e l f  d if fe r s  
frcm i t s  e s se ï^
The example of whiteness in  Socrates above seems to  be an un­
fo rtunate  one fo r  th i s  argument, and makes i t  d i f f ic u l t  to  fathom S t. 
Thomas' meaning. Obviously whiteness i s  acc iden ta l to  Socrates; but 
in  what way can i t  be taken , to  say th a t Socrates ' essence i s  only 
acc iden ta lly  united  to  h is esse? Surely the union i s  not l ik e  th a t  of 
colour in  a body. Thomas' obscurity  here i s  unfortunate and d is ­
appointing because th is  argument i s  one of the few where he expressly 
determines to  show th a t esse and essence are d iffe re n t in  c rea tu res . 
Other times he shows the id e n tity  in  God and the subsequent imposs­
i b i l i t y  of an id e n ti ty  in  c rea tu res.
Thcmas continues th is  same lin e  of reasoning in  h is  second 
argument when he considers a natura communis as separated. This sep­
arated  nature can be one only, even though many th ings possess the 
nature , fo r example, the nature of animal considered as separated would 
not include those th ings which are  proper to  man or ox, because i f  i t
16 Cont. Gent. I I ,  c . 52: S i enim esse e s t su b s is te n s ... .
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did have them i t  would not be animal alone, but man or ox. In  the 
same way, Thomas argues, i f  the d ifferences which co n stitu te  the 
species, and which divide the genus, be removed, only the undivided 
nature of the genus would remain. I f  then, th is  th ing  i t s e l f  which 
i s  esse i s  common as a genus, esse separation, per se su b s is ten s . 
can be one only. However Thomas goes on to  say th a t  esse i s  not div­
ided by d iffe ren ces, as i s  a genus, but ra th e r  by the fa c t th a t  i t  
i s  the esse of th is  or th a t th ing , and he adds th a t th is  makes i t  even 
more m anifest th a t esse per se ex istens can be one only. And since 
th is  esse subsistens i s  God, nothing e lse  besides Him can be i t s  own 
esse .^?
This argument i s  l ia b le  to  the charge of thinking w ith the im­
ag ination , I t  has no meaning to  speak of a common nature as separated. 
Only ind iv idual th in g s e x is t on to log ically . S im ilarly , i t  i s  only 
im aginatively tru e  to  speak of a genus with the d ifferences con­
s t i tu t in g  the species removed. And to  compare esse to  such a genus 
to  a rr iv e  a t  esse subsistens being only one, i s  again only imagina­
tio n . In  a l l ,  the e ffe c t i s  to  destroy  confidence in  the argument, 
and i t  i s  once again disappointing.
In a th ird  argument Thomas says th a t abso lu te ly  in f in i te  esse 
cannot be twofold since abso lu te ly  in f in i te  esse would include in  i t ­
se lf  every perfec tion , and so nothing would d if fe re n tia te  two such 
th in g s . Esse subsistens must be in f in i te  though because i t  i s  not 
lim ited  by, or received in to  any re c ip ie n t. Therefore th e re  i s  only
17 Cont. Gent. I I ,  c . 52: Natura communis, s i  s e p a ra ta . . . .
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Thomas bu ilds another argument on a theme broached ju s t above,
tha t i s ,  th a t nothing belongs to  esse per se subsistens except what
i s  proper to  ens in so fa r i s  i t  i s  ens. Anything e lse  belongs to  the
th ing  only acc id en ta lly  by reason of the sub ject. I f  then th is  l a s t
th ing  were separated from the subject i t  would in  no way belong to
i t .  Now Thomas introduces the new argument th a t i t  does not belong
to  ens in so fa r as i t  i s  ens to  be caused by another. Because i f  i t
did every ens would be caused by another and an in f in i te  reg ression  of
19causes would re s u l t ,  which Thomas shows i s  im possible. Esse sub-
20s is ten s  then i s  uncaused, and no caused ens can be i t s  own esse .
In a new l in e  of reasoning Thomas says th a t the substance of
any th ing  belongs to  i t  per se , and not through another, and by way
of i l lu s t r a t io n  says th a t the  lum inosity of a i r  does not p e rta in  to
i t s  substance, but ra th e r  comes from something e ls e . Every creature
though has esse frcm something e ls e , .otherwise i t  would not be caused.
21In  no created substance then i s  the esse the same as th a t substance.
And in  another mode of argumentation Thomas says th a t because 
an agent a c ts  in so fa r as i t  i s  in  a c t ,  the f i r s t  agent must be most 
p e rfec tly  in  a c t .  An agent i s  more p e rfec tly  in  a c t the more i t s  
a c t i s  p o s te rio r in  the way of generation because in  anything passing
18 Cont. Gent. I I ,  c . 52: Im possibile e s t quod s i t  d u p lex ...,
19 Cont. Gent. I ,  c. 13: Aliam autem propositionem, s c i l ic e t  
quod in  moventibus e t  m otis non s i t  procedere in  in fin itum  probat 
tr ib u s  ra tio n ib u s ,
20 Cont. Gent. I I ,  c. 52: S i s i t  aliquod esse per se sub­
s is to n s . . . .
21 Cont. Gent. I I ,  c. 52: Substantia uniuscuiusque e s t e i 
per s e . . . .
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frcm potency to  a c tu a li ty , a c t i s  p o ste rio r in  time to  the potency. 
What has a c t ,  i s  in  ac t because of ac t i t s e l f ,  and so ac t i t s e l f  i s  
most p e rfec tly  in  ac t. Since as Thomas has shown th a t God alone i s  
the f i r s t  agent. He alone i s  in  act in  the most p e rfec t way, th a t i s ,
OOHe himself i s  the most perfec t a c t . But i t  i s  esse which term inates 
a l l  generation and motion, since every form and ac t i s  in  potency un­
t i l  i t  acquires esse . God alone then i s  His own esse ju s t a s He alone
23i s  the f i r s t  agent.
From th is  Thomas goes on to  say th a t  i t  i s  in  accordance with 
the nature of God th a t ipsum esse belong to  the f i r s t  agent since 
God's esse i s  h is  substance. But, he adds, th a t  which belongs to  
something according to  i t s  nature can belong other th ings only by way 
of p a rtic ip a tio n , a s , fo r  example, heat i s  in  many bodies by means of 
f i r e .  So th e re fo re , ipsum esse belongs to  a l l  th ings by a c e rta in  
p a rtic ip a tio n  in  the f i r s t  agent. The substance of no th ing  belongs 
to  i t  by way of p a rtic ip a tio n , though, and hence only in  God i s  ipsum
OIlesse the same as the substance.
Having shown th a t the substance of a created in te l le c t  i s  d is ­
t in c t  frcm i t s  e sse , S t. Thomas goes on to  show th a t the  composition 
of substance and esse i s  a composition of potency and a c t. This i s  a 
very important consideration because i t  Ëiows a t  some length  how 
in te l le c tu a l  c rea tu res are in  potency to  actus essendi. This question
22 Cont. Gent. I ,  c. 13.
23 Cont. Gent. I I ,  c. $2: Cum omne agens agat inquantum e s t 
a c tu . . . .
24 I b id . ; Ipsum esse competit primo a g e n t i . . . .
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has already been b r ie f ly  touched on above, but the arguments here 
w ill take on new relevance in  the l ig h t of the d is tin c tio n s  of esse 
and essence ju s t explored.
Because everything i s  in  ac t through having e sse , ipsum esse 
i s  the complement of the e x is tin g  substance. But Thomas says when­
ever one th ing  i s  the complement of the o ther, there  e x is ts  a pro­
portion of potency to  a c t between them. Therefore in  every created 
in te l le c tu a l  substance the composition of substance and esse i s  a 
composition of potency and ac t.^^
And since an agent makes something to  be in  a c t, whatever a 
th ing  has frcm an agent must be a c t. A ll substances however have esse 
from the f i r s t  agent, and they are caused by the f a c t  th a t  they have 
esse from another. Every caused substance then has esse in  i t  as a 
ce rta in  a c t of i t s  own. But since act i s  re fe rred  to  potency, th a t 
in  which ac t i s  present i s  a potency, and so every created  substance
26has a composition of act and potency.
Thomas a lso  shows the act and potency composition in  created 
substances, when he says th a t  God alone i s  one and th a t a l l  other 
th ings p a rtic ip a te  in  esse . Anything which p a rtic ip a te s  in  another 
i s  actualized  in  such and such a way by what i s  p a rtic ip a te d , and the 
p a rtic ip a to r  i s  compared to  what i s  p a rtic ip a ted  as potency to  a c t .  
Hence created substance i s  compared to  i t s  own esse as potency to
25 Cont. Gent. I I ,  c. 53: In  quocumque enim inveniuntur aliqua 
duo quorum unum e s t conplementum a l te r iu s ,  proportio  unius eorum ad 
alterum e s t s ic u t proportio  po ten tiae  ad actum.
26 I b id . ; Quod in e s t a l ic u i  ab agente, oportet esse a c tu m ....
27 I b id .Î Omne p artic ip an s a liq u id  comparator.. . .
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A th ing  i s  made sim ila r to  i t s  e f f ic ie n t  cause by a c t be­
cause agents produce th e ir  l ik e  in so fa r as they are  in  a c t .  But 
i t  i s  through ipsum e sse . Thomas says, th a t every created  substance 
i s  made sim ila r to  God. Hence ipsum esse i s  compared to  a l l  c rea tu res
as th e ir  a c t . And so in  every created substance there  i s  a composi-
28tio n  of potency and a c t.
In te l le c tu a l  substances then , including the sou l, are, in  po­
tency with respec t to  actus essend i. Their esse i s  lim ited , and en­
t i r e ly  received frcm ipsum esse subsis ten s. Thus they are  in  potency 
to  what they p a rtic ip a te  in .
Thomas develops some very basic notions concerning esse when 
he shows th a t the composition of substance and esse i s  not the same 
as th a t of m atter and form. Both of these compositions are  composi­
tio n s  of potency and a c t .  They are not the same because m atter i s  
not the substance of a th ing , but only a p a rt of the substance. 
Otherwise form would only be an accident of a th in g . I t  follow s a lso  
because ipsum esse i s  the proper ac t of the whole substance, since 
esse i s  the a c t of th a t which i s .  So esse i s  predicated of the whole 
substance, not ju s t  the m atter. M atter then cannot be ca lled  th a t 
which i s  but ra th e r  substance i s  th a t which i s  (W quod e s t ) .  Thomas 
a lso  denies th a t form i s  ipsum e sse , but says instead  th a t there  i s  a 
re la tio n  of order between them: form i s  compared to  iPsum esse as 
l ig h t  i s  to  illum ina ting , or as whiteness i s  to  being w hite. Also 
ipsum esse i s  compared even to  form i t s e l f  as a c t .  For in  th ings
28 Cont. Gent. I I ,  c. 53î A ssim ilatio  a licu iu s  ad causam 
agentem f i t  per ac tu m ....
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which are  compositions of m atter and form the form i s  said to  be 
the p rincip le  of being ( principium essendi) . because i t  i s  the com­
plement of the substance whose ac t i s  ipsum esse . Thomas explains 
th is  w ith an example saying th a t  transparency i s  the p rin c ip le  of 
illum ination  w ith respect to  a i r  because i t  makes the a irc th e  proper 
subject of l ig h t . 29
Thomas b r ie f ly  summarizes t h i s  a l l  by saying th a t in  th ings 
composed of m atter and form, n e ith e r the m atter or the form, nor even 
ipsum esse can be termed th a t  which i s  ( ipsum quod e s t ). Then he ex­
p lains th a t  the form i s  th a t  by which i t  is  (quo e s t ) , because i t  i s  
the p rin c ip le  of being; and the whole substance i t s e l f  i s  th a t which 
i s  (quod e s t ) ; and ipsum esse i s  th a t by which the substance i s  ca lled  
a being (ens). In  an in te l le c tu a l  substance however where there  i s  
no composition of m atter and form, the form i t s e l f  i s  th a t which i s  
(quod e s t)  and ipsum esse i s  the act and th a t by which (quo e s t ) the 
substance i s .  And so Thomas says th a t in  in te l le c tu a l  substances 
there  i s  only one composition, th a t of substance and e sse , whereas 
substances composed of m atter and form have the twofold composition: 
f i r s t  the substance i t s e l f  i s  composed of m atter and form; and second, 
the substance so composed and e sse .^^
Composites of m atter and form are  not a t  once ens and one.^^ 
M atter i s  ens in  potency only and i s  made ens a c tu a lly  by the advent 
of the form which i s  i t s  causa essendi. M atter of i t s e l f  does not
29 Cont. Gent. I I ,  c. 54.
30 Ib id .
31 De S p ir . G rea t., a . 1, ad 5.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
90
32p a rtic ip a te  ipsum e sse , but by i t s  form. The form coming to  the 
m atter makes i t  ipsum esse a c tu , as fo r  instance, the soul does to  
the body. The form however does not have esse by any other form.^^
A subsis ten t form then would be a t  once ens and one, having no fo r­
mal cause of i t s  e sse . I t  would have some cause of i t s  esse though 
because a l l  f in i te  subsistences are in  potency to  ipsum esse sub­
sis ten s  which i s  the cause of a l l  o ther esse .
Thomas explains the ro le  of the form when he says th a t "as 
long as the form i s  present a th in g  must e x is t because i t  i s  by the
form th a t the substance i s  made the proper rec ip ie n t of th a t which 
34i s  e sse ."  This i s  a lso  asserted  when he says th a t  the ac tion  of
anything belongs to  the whole composite, because to  a c t belongs to
what has e sse , and the composite has esse by the form, and so the
composite ac ts  by the f o r m . 55 Forms which depend on m atter according
to  esse are not said to  have esse properly, but ra th e r , esse belongs
36to  the composite by the form. Thomas speaks again of the a c t-  
potency re la tio n sh ip  of esse and form when he says th a t the subsis ten t
32 Ib id . . a . 1, c . : In natura ig i tu r  rerum corporearum m ateria 
non per se p a r tic ip â t ipsum esse, sed per formam; forma enim adveniens 
m aterlae f a c i t  ipsam esse actu , s icu t anima corpori.
33 De S p ir. G reat. . a . 1, ad 5.
34 Cont. Gent. I I ,  c. 55: Forma enim manente, oportet rem esse;
per formam enim substan tia  f i t  proprium susceptivum eius quod e s t  esse.
35 Cont. Gent. I I ,  c. 50; Actio cu iu slib e t ex m ateria e t forma 
ccmpositi non e s t tantum formae, nec tantum m ateriae, sed compositi: 
e ius enim e s t agere cuius e s t esse ; esse autem e s t  ccmpositi per 
formam; unde e t ccmpositum per formam a g it .
36 Cont. Gent. I I ,  51: Formae enim secundum esse a m ateria
dépendantes non ipsae proprie habent esse sed composite per ip sa s .
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forms of incorporeal substances cannot be deprived of the a c t of
the form because esse i s  consequent to  the form and nothing i s  co rr-
37upted except i t  lo se  i t s  form. Esse i s  the a c tu a lity  of every form
or na tu re , because only in so fa r as goodness and humanity, fo r example,
have e sse , are they said  to  be in  act.^® Ipsum esse i s  the most
perfect of a l l  th in g s , Thomas says, and i s  compared to  these th ings 
39as th e i r  a c t .^ ' This i s  so because nothing has ac tu a lity -ex cep t in ­
sofar as i t  i s ;  ipsum esse then is  the a c tu a lity  of a l l  th ings in ­
cluding the forms themselves. Thomas says immediately then th a t ipsum 
esse i s  not to  be canpared to  o ther th ings as the receiver i s  to  what 
i s  received ( rec ip iens ad receptum). but ra th e r  the reverse , as what 
i s  received i s  to  the receiver. For example, to  speak of the ease 
of a man or horse, or any o ther th ing  i s  to  speak of ipsum esse as 
what i s  received; i t  i s  not to  speak of th a t to  which esse belongs.
This l a s t  section  on the metaphysical foundations of Thomas' 
consideration of the powers cleared up several problems which were 
carried  over from e a r l ie r  p a rts  of the th e s is .  The d is tin c tio n  of 
the powers from the essence of the soul depended on the d is tin c tio n  
of a th in g 's  operations from i t s  e sse . This la s t  d is tin c tio n  was es­
tab lished  here. The d is tin c tio n  of the powers from the essence a lso
37 Sum. Theol. I ,  q. 9, a . 2, c . : Substantiae vero incorporeae, 
quia sunt ipsae formae subsis tan tes , quae tamen se habent ad esse 
ipsarum sicu t po ten tia  ad actum, non compatiuntur secum privationem 
huius ac tus; quia esse consequitur formam; e t  n ih i l  corrumpitur 
n is i  per hoc quod a m itti t  formam.
38 Ib id . . q. 3, a . 4 , c . : esse e s t a c tu a lité s  cmnis formas vel 
naturae; non enim bonitas v e l humanités s ig n if ic a tu r  in  ac tu , n is i  
prout significam us eam esse.
39 Ib id . . q . 4 , a . 1, ad 3: Dicendum quod ipsum esse e s t 
perfectissimum omnium; comparetur enimaad cmnia u t ac tu s.
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hinged on the d is tin c tio n  of esse and essence in  c rea tu res: th i s  too 
was estab lished  here, and in  fa c t  was the main concern of the  whole 
section . Several disappointments were noted concerning Thomas' proofs 
th a t esse and essence were d is t in c t  in  in te l le c tu a l  c rea tu res . Though 
re levan t, the c ritic ism s did not destroy the main concept. A th ird  
major problem cleared up here was how in te l le c ts  were in  potency to
actus essendi. Other po in ts which were estab lished  were th a t form
was th a t  by which a th in g  has e sse , and th a t  esse i s  the  a c t of
every substance, by which the substance becomes a being.
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VII CONCLUSION
There are two p o sitio n s  which can be maintained concerning the 
powers of the human sou l, two positions which are d iam etrica lly  
opposed. One m aintains th a t  the powers a re  the essence of the soul, 
while the o ther m aintains th a t  the powers a re  accidents of the soul.
The premise of the f i r s t  p o sitio n  i s  th a t  the essence of the 
soul i s  the immediate p rinc ip le  of a l l  of i t s  operations, A nec­
essary consequence of th is  i s  th a t the powers are a l l  su b s ta n tia l 
p rin c ip le s  o f operation. Only substances a re  ab le  to  operate in  
such fashion as to  understand, to  w il l ,  or to  sense. A second con­
sequence i s  th a t any d is tin c tio n  of powers i s  only nominal. I f  the 
powers are id e n tif ie d  w ith the sou l, and i f  the powers a re  su b s ta n tia l 
p rin c ip le s  of operation, then , since the soul i s  only one substance, 
there  can be only one p rin c ip le  of operation: and to  name many powers 
i s  only to  name the d iffe re n t operations of th a t one p r in c ip le , the 
essence of the  soul.
In  e f fe c t ,  ly  saying th a t the powers are  the essence of the soul, 
th is  position  makes the operations of man sim ila r to  the operations of 
God. God i s  His essence, and His power, and His operations. He i s  
one p rin c ip le , and from Him flow many c rea tu res . Man, i f  he a c ts  
immediately by h is  essence, a lso  w ill  have only one p rin c ip le  fo r 
h is  many operations. However there  i s  one difference between the 
operations of God and the operations of man, and th is  one difference 
w ill  be the  d ifference which es tab lish es  the  second position  concerning
93
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the powers of the soul as acc iden ts . The d ifference i s  th a t  in  God 
His operations are  the same as His e sse , while in  man they are  d is ­
t in c t  from h is  esse .
How w il l  th is  d ifference e s ta b lish  the  powers as accidents? 
Only in d ire c t ly :  by fu rn ish ing  arguments to  show th a t the powers 
cannot be the essence of the sou l. And i f  the powers are not the 
essence, then  the two consequences of th is  position , which made the  
powers substances, and which made the d is tin c tio n  of powers nominal, 
w il l  a lso  go by the board. Really then the problem b o ils  down to  
whether or not the powers are the same as the  essence of the soul: 
everything e lse  follow s from the answer to  th is  question .
In  no creature i s  the operation id e n tic a l with i t s  e sse . I t s  
second a c t ,  operation, always follow s on i t s  f i r s t  a c t , which i s  e sse . 
Only in  God are the two id e n tif ie d . The essence of every creature i s  
re la te d  to  i t s  esse in  the same manner th a t i t s  power i s  re la te d  to
i t s  operations. But because the operations are d is t in c t  from the
e sse , in  a l l  c rea tu res , the powers must be d is t in c t  from the essence. 
Again, only in  God would power be id e n tif ie d  with the essence.
The abso lu te ly  fundamental ten e t of the argument which makes i t  
impossible fo r  the powers of the soul to  be I t s  essence, i s  the d i s t ­
in c tio n  of essence and e sse , and re la tio n sh ip  of essence to  esse as
potency to  a c t ,  or power to  operation. Without th is  d is tin c tio n  and 
re la tio n sh ip  i t  has no meaning to  speak of powers. The powers would 
become one with operations and ind istingu ishab le  from them. They 
would become one w ith th e ir  essence and esse . I f  essence was not 
d is t in c t  from e sse , then the powers would be the essence, the  op­
e ra tio n s  would be the esse , th e  powers would be the operations, and
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the creatu re  would be God. But man i s  not God, and so h is  essence 
i s  not h is  e sse , and, more re lev an tly  here, h is  power i s  not h is 
essence.
What a re  the consequences of saying the powers are  not to  be 
id e n tif ie d  with the essence of the  soul? Two -  ju s t  as fo r  the opp­
o s ite  viewpoint. F i r s t ,  because the powers are not e s se n tia l  p rin ­
c ip le s  of operation, they have to  be acciden ta l p rin c ip le s  of opera­
tio n . As acciden ta l p rin c ip le s  of operation they may be taken in  two 
senses. In  one sense the  powers are acciden tal forms in  the second 
species of q u a lity . These powers, as accidental forms, have onto­
lo g ic a l r e a l i ty ,  and operate by the power of the su b s tan tia l form 
to  bring  a th ing  to  ac t in  such and such a way. In the second sense, 
the powers can be taken as n a tu ra l p roperties of the  soul. But as 
p roperties they are  always reducible to  the f i r s t  sense of the term 
acc iden t, and so as p roperties they are best regarded as lo g ica l 
e n t i t ie s .  The important th ing  i s  th a t  the powers are  accidents of 
the soul with on to log ical r e a l i ty .
The second consequence of d istingu ish ing  the  powers from the 
essence of the soul, l ik e  the f i r s t ,  i s  a t  complete variance with the 
opposing view. Using the same general p rin c ip le , th a t  operations 
d is tin g u ish  the powers, the viewpoint th a t d istingu ishes the powers 
frcm the  essence, and makes these powers acc iden ta l ontological en­
t i t i e s ,  ends up with many r e a l ly  d is t in c t  powers. The powers a re  not 
merely nominal appendages to  the one p rin c ip le , the  essence. They 
are  onto logical e n t i t ie s  d is t in c t  from the essence, and d is t in c t  from 
one another. Each i s  the p rin c ip le  of i t s  own sp e c if ic a lly  d if fe re n t 
operation. ^
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And so the two viewpoints concerning the powers o f the soul 
have been presented and con trasted . On th ree  major po in ts : whether 
the essence i s  i t s  powers? whether the powers are accidents? and 
whether the powers are  re a lly  distinguished? the opposing views 
have been examined. With the d is tin c tio n  of essence and esse in  
man, the powers of the soul must be d is t in c t  from the essence and 
they must be acc iden ta l p rin c ip le s  of operation, re a lly  d is t in c t  
one from the o ther. Without the d is tin c tio n  of essence and esse 
th is  positio n  must reduce i t s e l f  to  the e s e e n tia l is t  view, which 
makes the essence of the soul the immediate p rinc ip le  of i t s  op­
e ra tio n s , which makes the powers e sse n tia l or su b s tan tia l p rin c ip les  
of operation, > l^oh makes the distinction of the powers nominal, 
which makes man into God.
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